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In Response
to Walter Gillis Peacock’s review in Hemisphere 6:1, David Stoll unites

W hen I published Between Two
Armies in the Ixil Towns of Guatemala,
I knew it would inflam e some read
ers because it breaks with solidarity
interpretations of one of the most
oppressive countries in Latin
America. T he solidarity m ovem ent
is an international network which
identifies the interests of the
G uatem alan people with the guerril
la m ovem ent and the popular orga
nizations of the left. Exemplified by
I, Rigoberta Menchu, the most widely
read book on Guatemala, solidarity
thinking derives considerable plausi
bility from the arm y’s record of b ru
tality. Indeed, having m ade hum an
rights its m ain issue, the solidarity
m ovem ent is easy to confuse with
hum an rights activism. T he two
com m unities share many o f the
same discourses and constituencies.
Yet if we want to cut through the
tangle of assum ptions which keep
the last civil war in C entral America
tip and running, it’s im portant to
m ake the distinction.
T hat the G uatem alan army has
been an egregious violator of
hum an rights, for example, does
not m ean that its guerrilla oppo
nents are cham pions o f hum an
rights, even if they present them 
selves as such. Yet while a hum an
rights organization ought to attend
to violations by both sides, a solidar
ity organization will target only gov
ern m e n t abuses because its priority
is supporting the revolutionary
m ovem ent. A related blind-spot is
th at the solidarity m ovem ent has
never acknowledged the guerrilla
role in the escalation o f political vio
lence.
I believe this is why your reviewer
Walter Gillis Peacock (W inter/Spring
1994) is so offended that I blame

guerrilla raids for provoking the
arm y’s occupation of n o rth ern
Q uiche D epartm ent. He is so
offended that he accuses m e of lay
ing the entire blam e for the vio
lence on the guerrillas and apolo
gizing for the massacres o f the
G uatem alan army. Outrageous,
Walter. Pointing out that the guer
rillas fired the first shot, and that
the army d id n ’t show up in n o rth 
ern Q uiche until after that, is not
the same as justifying the m urders
the army com m itted. If I was so con
cerned to exonerate the army, why
does Between Two Armies publicize
massacres that never m ade it into
hum an rights reports?
Walter also objects that Between
Two Armies is narrow and decontextualized. This despite the fact that
it was a local, fieldwork-based study
(for a wider study which comes to
the same conclusion— that the guer
rillas imposed an alien form of
struggle on Mayan Indian com m u
nities with disastrous results—see
Yvon Le Bot’s La Guerre en Terre
Maya, published by Editions
Karthala, Paris, 1992). T he real
problem , I suspect, is that the warweary neutralism I found in a sup
posed bastion o f the guerrilla move
m ent contradicts solidarity assump
tions that this was a deeply rooted
popular uprising.
In any case, my findings are
em pirical ones that can be tested
through fu rth er research, w ithout
need for rhetorical analogies to the
Zapatistas across the b o rd er in
Mexico. H ere I found W alter’s grat
itude to the Zapatistas, for giving
him a new guerrilla uprising to
believe in, both revealing and worri
some. If it is m ore im portant to
m aintain Guatemala as a m etaphor

for the culture o f terro r than it is to
listen to peasants who are tired of
being heaped on the altar o f revolu
tionary m iscalculation, then peasant
life is cheap even on the academ ic
left.
T he question for the future is
w hether it is still sufficient to assign
all the blam e for the violence on
the G uatem alan army, as the solidar
ity m ovem ent is accustom ed to do.
O r w hether after three decades of
civil strife, in which Guatemalans
seem alm ost as disgusted with the
guerrillas as they are with the army,
it is time to question rationales for
violence by both sides. I fear that,
because of confusion between soli
darity and hum an rights assump
tions, G uatem ala’s status as a
hum an rights pariah will justify the
guerrillas to keep fighting long after
they have lost m ost of the support
they once enjoyed (C ontrary to the
review, no one ever said there were
17,000 Ixils in the guerrilla-allied
Com m unities of Population
Resistance (CPRs) of the Sierra.
CPR officials used to claim that
there were about 12,000, as rep o rt
ed in my book; now this figure turns
out to have been seriously inflated).
Far from apologizing for the
G uatem alan army, my analysis of
what happened to the guerrilla
m ovem ent in n o rth ern Quiche
should be viewed as part of a long
standing debate in Latin America
over the wisdom of arm ed struggle.
More such debate is badly needed in
Guatemala, where the left faces a difficult struggle to get out from un d er
the shadow of its many martyrs. ■

David Stoll
Davis, California
H em isphere • Sum mer 1994
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Summi t Madness
Eduardo A. Gamarra

he an n o u ncem ent that
Miami would host the
Summit of the Americas
(D ecem ber 9-11) spawned
a veritable cottage indus
try based on the upcom 
ing event. Non-profit organizations,
universities, business, and others
mobilized expecting that their preSummit scurrying could shape the
agenda. With similar expectations,
private and public institutions
aro u n d Latin America launched
campaigns to assure a presence in
December.
Kind words for Latin America
from the Florida establishm ent are
norm ally scarce, b u t these days,
praise for the reg io n’s econom ic lib
eralization and erstwhile dem ocrati
zation is legion. The state of Florida
has b en t over backwards to prepare
for the Summit. After personally
convincing President Clinton to
hold the event in Miami, G overnor
Lawton Chiles appointed a m ultieth
nic Sum m it Steering Com m ittee to
work with the State D epartm ent.
Fearing that it would focus solely on
Miami, Chiles also appointed a
Florida Steering Com m ittee to advo
cate the local interests o f places like
O rlando, Tampa, and Jacksonville.
A lthough the crisis in Cuba and
Haiti tem porarily disrupted plan
ning, there was never any doubt
(given the ailing Florida tourist
industry) that the show must go on.
In late August, for example, uncon
firm ed rum ors began circulating

T

Eduardo Gamarra, associate professor■of
political science at Florida International
University and the acting director of the
Latin American and Caribbean Center, is
the editor o/Hem isphere.
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that the State D epartm ent was con
sidering moving the Sum m it from
Miami to de-emphasize the Cuban
and Haitian debacles. The Steering
com m ittee moved with all due haste
to squash the rum ors before they
could get a toehold. Summit hyste
ria is so strong in Florida that long
term plans for post Summit events
are already afoot.
This autum n, pre-Summit confer
ences dotted the hem isphere and
the state. In addition to summits at
the sub-regional level where heads
o f state are expected to discuss their
respective Miami strategies, Florida

Political leaders are now
expecting something more
than yet another declaration
o f fraternal affection.

and several Latin Am erican partici
pants have planned separate m eet
ings on the environm ent, trade,
transportation, and finance and
banking. All o f this has transpired
w ithout an official agenda. Most
conference organizers have
prom ised to produce white papers
to be delivered to the heads of state
during their two day encounter in
Miami. At the current rate of pro
duction, presidents and prim e m in
isters will have to dedicate the bet
ter part o f the winter to white paper
reading.
President C linton’s invitation to
the Sum m it outlined a broad agen
da, citing dem ocracy and good gov
ernance, trade, investment, and sus
tainable developm ent. With such

generous param eters, it has been
possible to include nearly every
im aginable issue u n d er the sun,
from official corruptio n to NAFTA
accession—but not Cuba and not
Haiti. To the chagrin and em bar
rassm ent o f the Sum m it’s organiz
ers, however, the H aitian and C uban
com m unities in Miami will not let
Sum m it-hoppers forget. Official
plans allow dem onstrations and
o ther public expressions of discon
tent, but dem onstrators will have no
direct access to the visiting heads of
state. A part from pre-Summit
events, the only o ther item in place
is for provision of security to 34
leaders and their delegations.
T he o th er great absentee at the
Summit will be the war on drugs,
which so dom inated the ReaganBush era. Officials in the State
D epartm ent’s B ureau of
International Narcotics Matters note
with disappointm ent th at drugs will
no t appear on anyone’s agenda
short list because the Summit orga
nizers in W ashington intend to dis
cuss only positive dim ensions of USW estern hem isphere ties. For the
A ndean countries this may be the
m ost welcome news. T heir concerns
about developing export markets
and the like may finally receive
redress no t conditioned on coun
ternarcotics perform ance.
Clinton is counting on a m uch
needed opportunity to establish
some foreign policy credentials and
some legitimacy in his hem ispheric
policy. Persons close to the
President claim that Clinton will use
the Summit to unveil the century’s
“third most significant US policy ini
tiative toward Latin Am erica,” (the
other two being the Good N eighbor
Policy and the Alliance for Progress).
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The official agenda remains shrouded in mystery,
but everyone wants in on the Summit anyway
This p ro n o u n cem ent has had
great resonance th roughout the
hem isphere. Political leaders have
reacted with a m arked degree of
optimism and m ost are now expect
ing som ething m ore than yet anoth
er declaration o f fraternal affection.
In o th er words, Latin Americans,
Caribbeans, and Canadians will
com e to Miami expecting the
Clinton adm inistration to deliver
som ething of substance. For the
reg io n ’s leaders, this would be a
prom ise from W ashington to expe
dite free trade agreem ents and
access to the US m arket, but the
likelihood o f serious m id-term elec
toral setbacks dam pen prospects for

follow-through. If the past is pro
logue, the leaders o f the region will
be disappointed one m ore time.
In short, Clinton will pu t a legit
imizing seal on what are essentially
Republican policies crafted in the
waning days of the Cold War.
Criticizing Clinton for continuity,
especially in his Latin American
policy, has becom e a new national
pastime, but to expect this adm inis
tration to engage in radical depar
tures misses a broader point.
Clinton is the first president whose
m ain task has been to dism antle
not only the Cold War military arse
nal, but the accom panying bureau
cratic apparatus. His task is some

what similar to the one H arry
T rum an faced in the afterm ath of
World War II. Several years elapsed
before George K ennan and others
crafted the Cold War strategy that
guided US foreign policy for over
three decades. T he Clinton adm in
istration has yet to find its George
Kennan. So far the Ivy Leaguers
who were brought in as Latin
Am erican advisors have failed to
produce any coheren t set of
policy recom m endations. The
Sum m it o f the Americas may be
the place and the timing may be
correct for the launching o f a new
post Cold War Strategy vis-a-vis Latin
America. I

LATIN AMERICAN A N D CARIBBEAN CENTER
The Latin American and Caribbean Center at
Florida International University unveils
SummitNet, an Internet information project
for the upcoming Summit of the Americas.
O n December 9-11, 1994, the democratically
elected heads of state of the Western
Hemisphere will meet in Miami to discuss
trade, governance, and the environment.
SummitNet is your one-stop gateway for
country profiles, official documents, M iam i
Herald articles, and independent commen
taries. Point your Gopher client software to
SUMMIT.FIU.EDU. You can e-mail SUMMIT.FIU.EDU or call (305) 348-2894 for
more information.
F L O R ID A IN T E R N A T IO N A L U N IV E R S IT Y
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Fault Li nes
Lisandro Perez

nom ic crisis poses a threat to the
bittersweet joke circulat
ing in Cuba last year tells
stability o f the governm ent.
of the situation twenty
T hat is, until the start o f C uba’s
years from now when the
ho t August, featuring several clashes
island’s developm ent
between dem onstrators and security
regresses so m uch that it
forces. For the first time in m ore
resem bles the Stone Age, with itsthan three decades, the streets of
Cuba have seen open defiance of
inhabitants foraging for food in an
the regim e by the population. The
overgrown wilderness, isolated from
largest confrontation occurred on
the rest of the world. Two Cubans,
August 5 as a crowd estim ated in
in their loincloths, are attem pting
excess of 10,000 persons battled
to make a fire by striking stones
police along H avana’s waterfront.
together, but the stones keep break
While street clashes are a new ele
ing. “I’ll tell you,” says one to the
m ent in the C uban landscape, they
other, “if Fidel does not give us bet
occur within a Cold War context
ter stones, th e re ’s going to be a lot
that is as old as the Revolution. Just
of trouble in this country.”
T he resiliency of the C uban gov
when it looks as if the developm ents
m ight take a fresh course, they
ern m en t in the face of ram pant
rapidly becom e trapped in time,
deterioration in the population’s
standard of living has baffled
replays of recu rren t them es. The
events of the past few weeks, both in
observers and frustrated its ene
W ashington and Havana, are good
mies. T he co untry’s econom ic crisis
examples of those perennial
(dubbed “the special p erio d ” by the
themes.
governm ent) dates to the loss of
subsidized trade and assistance from
Migration as a catalyst and escape
the form er Soviet bloc. T he crisis
valve. M igration has been for 35
has been d eepened by the unwill
ingness o f the regim e to institute
years the principal m anifestation of
m arket-oriented reform s that would
dissent and discontent. And so it
was again this m onth. T he spark for
increase production and services.
T he US em bargo has not helped
the street dem onstrations in Havana
matters.
August 5 was the rum or that the
At the household level, the situa
governm ent would allow anyone to
tion is desperate. If there is any
leave. T he crowd congregated at the
hope of having the bare necessities,
w aterfront, not in front o f govern
Cubans m ust resort to illegal trans
m ent buildings, its message: we are
actions. Access to the US dollar, the
fed up and we want to leave. W hen
only viable currency, is critical. Yet,
the clam or reaches an unbearable
there has been very little evidence,
pitch, and the num ber o f illegal
as the joke reflects, that the ecodepartures increases, Fidel Castro
allows people to leave. It is then that
the US, fearing an exodus, focuses
attention on Cuba. Castro success
Lisandro Perez is a sociologist and
fully alters US m igration policy and
director of the Cuban Research Institute
gets an escape valve for discontent,
at Florida International University.
giving his rule a new lease. Since
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the day he allowed people to leave,
there haven’t been reports of
dem onstrations in Havana.
Everyone in Cuba who is fed up is
busy building a raft.

US-Cuba policy is determined pri
marily by domestic political concerns.
With no real national security or
strategic issue at stake with Cuba,
and with no evident political pres
sure for a tu rn aro u n d in policy, US
policy towards Cuba becomes a
creature of dom estic politics. And
this time it is not even presidential
politics, but merely the reelection of
the incum bent Dem ocratic gover
n o r of Florida. O ne evening last
week, that governor ushered into
the White H ouse a group of
Miamians he presum ably deem ed
representative o f the C uban com
munity. T he message to Clinton was:
the new policy of no t accepting
rafters m ust be balanced with p u n 
ishm ent for Castro, otherwise
C uban Miami will be unhappy. The
President agrees to get tougher with
Castro because the G overnor
believes that otherw ise he “and the
President would have been in dras
tic trouble in Florida.”

Limited get-tough options. Having
agreed to punish Castro, the
President has very few viable
options, all of them fairly pusillani
mous. O ne is to increase the hours
of transmission of the US radio and
television broadcasts beam ed to
Cuba. The o ther is to tighten the
only loose screw left in the em bar
go: cash rem ittances and family vis
its to Cuba by C uban Americans.
Am ong the Miamians visiting the
White House there was overwhelm
ing support for prohibiting such

Commentary

Recurrent themes plague US-Cuba issues

transactions and trips. N ot one of
them represents that sector of the
com m unity whose prim ary concern
is helping their family m em bers in
Cuba. But even those m easures are
n o t regarded as tough enough by
many in the community, including
the Cuban-American m em bers of
Congress. So the next move is to
have a top aide casually bluff, on
national television, that a military
blockade is a possibility.

The get-tough policy is based on rais
ing the level of suffering and exaspera
tion of the Cuban people. In this last
ro u n d of decisions, the US in effect
collaborates with Castro in keeping
a b arrier between families and limits
critical assistance to family m em bers
in Cuba. Presumably, this is justified
because that suffering will inex
orably lead to an unspecified chain
of events (probably chaotic and vio
lent) th rough which Castro will
somehow be ousted and dem ocracy
instituted in Cuba. T he question
able theory beh in d this is that eco
nom ic hardship leads to political
change and th at fom enting chaos in
Cuba is consistent with the national
security interests o f the US.

The get-tough policies have thus far
not been effective. After m ore than
three decades o f a policy o f hostility
and isolation, Castro is still there.
T he new get-tough m easures will
undoubtedly reach new heights of
ineffectiveness. If people cannot
send cash rem ittances to family
m em bers, they will have a greater
incentive to travel to Cuba to take
the cash themselves. T he new
restrictions, o f course, do no t allow
direct flights from the US to Cuba,
so the solution will be to go through

a nearby third country. T he happi
est person in Havana right now is
the m anager o f C uba’s decrepit
national airline. Cubana can fly to
those third countries and pick up
the visitors and fly them in and out
o f Havana. If this policy persists,
they may yet m ake enough money
to replace their entire fleet o f old
Soviet planes.
These recu rren t them es are get
ting old and worn, and each time
they have been replayed over the
past four decades they have taken a
considerable toll am ong the C uban
people, here and in the island. It is
time that the US take its Cuba poli
cy seriously, no t ju st react to each
successive crisis. T he Clinton adm in
istration should initiate a process of
systematic deliberations and consul

tations with a broad range of
experts and interest groups so as to
arrive at a co herent Cuba policy
that will truly prom ote the national
security interests of US and dem oc
racy in Cuba. C onsultations with the
Cuban-American com m unity should
be broadly based, no t lim ited to a
handful of anointed spokespersons.
Im plem entation o f that policy
should no t be influenced by the
electoral situation in Florida.
If nothing changes in W ashington,
why should anyone there expect any
changes in Cuba? I

A version of this article originally
appeared in the L ondon Observer
and is reprinted here with the kind
permission of the author.
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Afta NAFTA
Raul Benitez Manaut

P

Congressional rejection o f NAFTA
would provoke a nationalist “reac
tio n ” in Mexico. T he vice president
concluded by placing the issue
between the “politics o f fear” and
the “politics of h o p e ”.
US opinion on Mexico is polar
ized: At one extrem e, Mexico is
seen as a poor, undem ocratic coun
try w ithout a future. At the other, it
is a country on its way to m odern
ization, overcom ing obstacles to
make the ju m p into the first world.
Mexican reality is midway between
these two opinions, and far m ore
complex.

Gore-Perot

One can neither hide the
social reali ty of Mexico
nor underestimate the
accelerated pace of change.

resident C linton’s support
o f the N orth American
Free Trade A greem ent
signaled continuity, but
Mexico is m arginal to his
foreign policy. In 1993,
political pressure from domestic
constituencies produced NAFTA
side agreem ents on labor and envi
ronm ental issues. O n the Mexican
side, President Carlos Salinas’s con
trol over his Senate and House of
Representatives ren dered similar
obstacles to approval non-existent.
In contrast, NAFTA opponents in
the US were im portant. Am ong
them was the form er presidential
candidate, Ross Perot.

O n Novem ber 9, 1993 CNN
broadcasted a debate between Vice
President A1 Gore and Ross Perot.
H ost Larry King’s opening remarks
h o n ed in on the central question:
will NAFTA be good for Americans
or not? Much o f the debate synthe
sized Am erican perceptions about
Mexico.
Gore defended NAFTA as an
opportunity to create the “largest
m arket in the world.” Perot criti
cized the overwhelm ing poverty of
the majority (“85% o f the Mexican
people work in absolute poverty”) ,
and M exico’s lack of democracy.
D efending recent political changes
in Mexico, Gore em phasized
NAFTA’s overwhelm ing role in that
co u n try ’s future, w arning that US

Raul Benitez M anaut is a researcher
at the Centro de Investigaciones
Interdisciplinarias en Humanidades,
Universidad Nacional de Mexico.
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O ne can neither hide the social
reality of Mexico n o r underestim ate
the accelerated pace of change
favoring econom ic m odernization
and dem ocratization, incom plete
though it may be. Mexicans also
have a distorted view of the U nited
States. Public opinion is nationalist,
anti-imperialist, or favors good rela
tions with the U nited States.

34 Votes
On November 17, 1993, US House
of Representatives approved NAFTA
by a m argin of 34 votes, a trium ph
for both Clinton and Salinas. In the
US, the winners were the big corpo
rations, who for the most part
backed NAFTA from the beginning.
Ratification coincided with the

favorable conclusion of the Uruguay
R ound of GATT. In both countries,
non-competitive small and m iddle
sized industries anticipated taking
the hardest hit.
T here are notable differences in
the way NAFTA will affect each
country. Because o f the US-Canada
precedent, NAFTA did n o t call for
changes in federal legislation, n or
in the law of the various states that
can expect m ajor NAFTA-induced
changes. By contrast, Mexican law
had to be substantially m odified to
allow NAFTA; im portan t parts of
the C onstitution, a pro d u ct o f the
revolution, were m odified for the
same reason.
D uring bilateral negotiations, the
Mexican governm ent succeeded in
forestalling reform s to the energy
(i.e., petroleum ) sector, but did
make notable changes in agrarian
law (i.e., the repeal of Article 27,
the basis of the Mexican ejido sys
tem) . Anticipated changes in the
labor law designed to draw foreign
investm ent are expected to have
im portant political repercussions,
since the Mexican political system is
predicated on the ruling party’s his
toric control over worker and peas
ant unions.
T he US vision of Mexico contin
ues to be polarized despite NAFTA
passage. Large sectors of the “estab
lishm ent” oppose NAFTA on the
grounds that US workers cannot
com pete with Mexican labor, which
is seven times cheaper.
Proponents, including Presidents
Clinton and Bush, point to consoli
dated and working econom ic
reform s in Mexico, and predict that
NAFTA will both hasten a political
transition toward dem ocracy while
fostering a stable framework for it.
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The promise of prosperity drives US-Mexico relations

Chiapas
T he political stability of Mexico
was tested on January 1, 1994, the
first day o f NAFTA im plem entation
and the d ebut of Zapatista guerrillas
in San Cristobal de las Casas, whose
first com m unique read “we have
declared war as of January 1st
because o f the im plem entation of
the Free Trade A greem ent.”
Chiapas changed the course of
Mexican politics, casting a pall over
the Salinas adm inistration and m od
ifying expectations about the future
o f the Mexican economy. It led
im p o rtan t sectors of public opinion
to question NAFTA as the best way
of jo in in g the first world. In the
US, the image of the m odern
Mexico that helped ratify NAFTA is
in doubt.
Prior to Chiapas, a favorable
investm ent climate sent large quan
tities of dollars into Mexico. At the
expense o f industry, m ost of the
m oney w ent into the stock
exchange, which is sensitive to per
ceptions of political stability. The
presidential candidate of the official
party Luis Donaldo Colosio led the
polls well ahead of this nearest con
tenders, C uauhtem oc C ardenas of
the Revolutionary Democratic Party,
and Diego Fernandez of the
A uthentic National Party.
T he im m ediate effect o f Chiapas
was to dam age the image of
President Salinas, and in turn, his
candidate Colosio. T he Mexican
arm y came u n d er fire for hum an
rights abuses, and then the govern
m ent called for a cease-fire on
Jan uary 12. In a radical departure
from the traditional response of
Latin Am erican governm ents to
insurgents, the Salinas governm ent
sought a political close to the con

flict. It agreed to m ajor changes in
the Cabinet and the establishm ent
of a Commission on Peace and
Reconciliation.

Chiapas changed the course
of Mexican politics. It led
important sectors of public
opinion to question NAFTA
as the best way of joining
the first world.
T he US Embassy sent an observer
mission to Chiapas to see for itself.
National Security Council advisor
Richard Feinberg, assigning a very
high specific weight to US influence
in the Mexican decision m aking
process, and ignoring internal
changes, said military maneuvers
were restrained, and a repetition of
1968 [Tlateloco Massacre] was
avoided because the Mexican gov
ern m e n t had signed onto NAFTA.
Public opinion in the US was
harsh on Salinas, criticizing his han
dling of Chiapas, his capacity to
m aintain stability, and the social
consequences o f econom ic m odern
ization in general. Mexican instabil
ity once again becam e an issue of
US national security. Following the
March 23, 1994 assassination of Luis
D onaldo Colosio, Clinton dem on
strated US com m itm ent to prevent
ing econom ic and political crisis in
Mexico, moving immediately to
extend a $6 billion line o f credit to
the governm ent.
Early 1994 statem ents from
Clinton adm inistration officials
belie a preoccupation with Mexico.

They forswear any inclination to
intervene in M exico’s internal m at
ters, and prom ise to support whoev
er wins the August 21 presidential
election. T he Inter-American
Dialogue (an organization with
close ties to C linton's Latin America
advisors) pronounced that “free
elections are the only course for the
stabilization of M exico.”

Conclusions
Anything beyond NAFTA,
Chiapas, stability, and a transition to
dem ocracy is secondary to bilateral
relations. Evaluations o f Mexican
anti-narcotics policy have been posi
tive, although discussions over US
law enforcem ent agents abducting
Mexican citizens inside Mexico
linger. T here are bo rd er problem s
arising from the poor treatm ent of
illegal Mexican im migrants, as well
as an unresolved dispute over the
US em bargo on Mexican tuna.
Differences over C entral America
are gone, and military relations,
though no t substantial, are good.
T he principal concern over US
national security in Mexico
revolves around political stability,
and the th reat of social decom posi
tion and ungovernability. If NAFTA
is to be im plem ented as envisioned
by both Presidents Bush and
Clinton, it is critical that the 1994
presidential succession and the
Mexican transition to dem ocracy be
successful. ■

Editor’s postscript — As this article went
to press, wire services reported the assas
sination, by an unknown assailant, of
Francisco Ruiz Maciel, Secretary General
of the PRI.
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Reports: M iam i

Calling the Shots
Da n o Moreno

he election of William
Jefferson Clinton as the
first D em ocratic president
in twelve years did no t sig
nificantly change US poli
cy toward Cuba. T he pres
id en t’s policy is still dom inated by
the perspectives and rhetoric of the
Cold War era; it continues the hard
line approach o f its Republican pre
decessors by m aintaining the US
trade em bargo against Cuba, oppos
ing renewal o f diplom atic relations,
and broadcasting anti-Castro news
to Cuba through both Radio and
TV Marti. Despite heavy criticism
from US allies in W estern Europe
and Latin America, Clinton rem ains
com m itted to isolating the island
until Castro steps down o r m eaning
ful dem ocratic reform s are initiated.
C linton’s Cuba policy is best
understood in the context of
dom estic US politics and the place
that Cuban-Americans hold in
them . Cuban-Americans have
becom e the single m ost im portant
interest group shaping Cuban poli
cy. To woo them away from their
traditional alliance with the
Republican party, the President has
been reluctant to alter the rigid
stance o f his conservative predeces
sors.

T

The Miami Strategy
Cuban com m unities are concentrat
ed in the im portant electoral states
o f Florida and New Jersey, where

Dario Moreno is associate professor of
political science at Florida International
University. He is the author of The
Struggle for Peace in Central
America, from University Press of
Florida (1994).
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the Democrats had a fighting
chance for the first time since the
1976 presidential race. Clinton was
the first Democratic presidential
nom inee to actively court the
Cuban vote in Florida. His south
ern electoral base and relatively
secure status in m ost “m ust w in”
states presented a rare opportunity
for a serious Dem ocratic campaign
in Florida. Moreover, CubanAm erican voting behavior showed
signs of diversifying
D uring several visits to Florida,
Clinton assured Cuban-Americans
that he would lay the groundw ork
for reversing some o f the lingering
bitterness o f President K ennedy’s
withdrawal of support for exiles dur
ing the Bay of Pigs, and Jimmy
C arter’s controversial 1977 dialogue
with Castro. T he Miami strategy of
the Democratic presidential candi
date was to assure the CubanAm erican com m unity that an
adm inistration of his party would
n o t lift the econom ic em bargo; ergo
his early and highly public endorse
m ent o f the Torricelli bill. Soon
afterwards, Clinton spent a night
raising $125,000 at two separate
Miami fundraisers attended pre
dom inantly by Cuban-Americans.
Follow-up visits by Hillary Clinton
(whose sister-in-law M aria Victoria
Arias, a Cuban-American
Republican, mobilized fellow
Cuban-Americans for Clinton) and
T ipper Gore were also successes.
Clinton took his cam paign for
Cuban-American votes to New
Jersey, whose 17 electoral college
votes had gone Republican in every
presidential race since 1964. With
the n atio n ’s second largest CubanAmerican community, New Jersey,
which had given Reagan, Bush, and

form er Republican G overnor Tom
Kean wide majorities, figured
prom inently in the G O P’s strategy.
To appeal to the state’s CubanAmericans, Clinton stressed his
close ties to the Torricelli bill and
nam ed R obert M enendez, a CubanAmerican D em ocrat and
Congressional candidate, to head
the New Jersey Hispanic campaign.
While formally endorsing Bush,
Jorge Mas Canosa, head of the influ
ential C uban Am erican N ational
Foundation (CANF) had heavy con
tact with Clinton. Mas Canosa
attended a Clinton fundraiser in
Miami’s Little Havana, displaying a
pragm atic streak within an organiza
tion often inaccurately depicted as
singularly tied to the Republicans.
He announced that “although I’m
voting for Bush out o f loyalty,
C linton’s decisive support of the
Cuban Democracy Act tu rn ed the
Cuban-American com m unity
a ro u n d .” Beyond opening the lines
o f com m unication with the CANF,
IB Cuban-American m em bers of
Dade C ounty’s 120 m em ber
Republican Executive Com m ittee
endorsed Clinton in Septem ber
1993, expressing their belief that
the D em ocrat would do m ore than
had Bush to rid Cuba of Castro.

Money Talks
Though Clinton carried New
Jersey, his Florida cam paign fell
short o f cutting into Bush’s two per
cent m argin o f victory there.
Despite the loss, the new ties forged
with Miami’s C uban elite were
unprecedented, and continued into
the presidency. T he Democratic
National Com m ittee raised over
$500,000 from Cuban contributors
in a 1994 Miami presidential

Reports: M iam i

Cuban-Americans politics drives presidential foreign policy

fundraiser; and when prom inent
C uban Americans opposed the
nom ination o f Mario Baeza for
Assistant Secretary o f State for InterAm erican Affairs, Clinton acceded
(see article b y jo h a n n a M endelson
Form an). T he adm inistration also
defended the controversial TV
M arti project against charges that it
was a poor use o f public resources.
Vice-President A1 Gore not only
m ade clear that the adm inistration
was com m itted to TV M arti but
declared th at it planned on “tu rn 
ing up the volum e” on radio and
television broadcast aim ed at the
island. W hen faced with the techni
cal difficulties confronting TV Marti,
Gore is reported to have replied
tersely, “L et’s try to make it work.”
T he adm inistration also backed
off the nom ination o f Elio E.
Muller, a Tam pa lawyer who ran the
Hispanic cam paign for Clinton in
Florida, to be director o f the US
Inform ation Agency’s Office of
Cuban Broadcasting— the office
th at oversees Radio and TV Marti.
According to sources at Radio
Marti, CANF opposed Muller, not
on ideological grounds bu t because
o f personal enm ity between Muller
and Mas Canosa.

“ Unshakable”
In short, the Clinton adm inistra
tion has gone out o f its way to
assure Cuban-Americans that there
will be no softening of US policy
toward Cuba. At a May 20, 1993
W hite House event to h o n o r Cuban
In d ep en d en ce Day, Clinton reiterat
ed support for the Torricelli bill and
prom ised Cuban-Americans from
both parties that he would m aintain
the em bargo. Six m onths later,
A lexander Watson, Assistant

Secretary of State for InterAm erican Affairs, echoed these sen
tim ents at a CANF-sponsored
fundraiser in Miami, prom ising that
the Clinton team would “continue
to pursue those issues that succes
sive adm inistrations have deter
m ined to be in o u r national inter
est. [The possibility o f softening the
Cuba policy] is false. Let there be
no confusion; o u r com m itm ent to
hum an rights and dem ocracy for
the Cuban people is unshakable.”
T he political influence o f the
Cuban-American com m unity in
shaping C uban policy has been
underscored during the recent
im m igration crisis. Over the sum
m er o f 1994, C uban citizens, some
times on hom em ade rafts, began
trying to cross the Straits o f Florida
to reach Key West. By August, the
US Coast G uard was rescuing
upwards of 2000 rafters a day.
Clinton, facing a flood of fleeing
Cubans, reversed long-standing US
im m igration policy and ordered
that Cubans w ithout US visas no
longer be automatically adm itted
into the US. Cuban-American polit
ical leaders seized this opportunity
to induce fu rth er tightening o f the
em bargo. After an August 19 m eet
ing with G overnor Lawton Chiles
(D-FL), Jorge Mas Canosa, and
o ther South Florida com m unity
leaders, the President im posed four
new restrictions on US-Cuban com
m ercial transaction: (1) The
Treasury D epartm ent announced
that sending m oney to Cuba would
be against the law in m ost cases.
(2) Travel from the US to Cuba
becam e illegal except for “hum ani
tarian reasons.” (3) Gift parcels to
Cuba would be limited to "hum ani
tarian items:” food, vitamins, seeds,

m edicine and medical supplies,
clothing and other products speci
fied by the US D epartm ent of
Commerce; and (4) the US would
begin pressuring the U nited Nations
to condem n the state o f hum an
rights in Cuba. Moreover, while the
Clinton adm inistration agreed to
open talks with the C uban govern
m ent on m igration, it has prom ised
not to discuss broader political and
econom ic issues with the Castro
regim e without evidence o f serious
dem ocratic opening.
Cuban-American voters dem on
strated that their vote m ust be court
ed, and the rising prom inence of
this voting bloc in presidential cam
paigns will keep Cuba on the foreign
policy agenda for the foreseeable
future. Republicans and Democrats
alike have displayed a willingness, if
no t an eagerness, to grant CubanAmericans veto power over US poli
cy toward Cuba. In the post-Cold
War period, decision-makers con
front a domestic arena with a wide
array o f politically influential
groups. T he absence of a hegem on
ic foreign policy paradigm broadens
opportunities for divergent domestic
interests to shape specific areas of
policy. Cuban-Americans have taken
advantage of this situation to
becom e far m ore influential in the
US political system than m ere num 
bers m ight suggest. T here are
approxim ately one m illion people of
Cuban descent in the US— barely
seven percent of the total Latino
population. These num bers, howev
er, do n o t reflect the rapid mobiliza
tion of the Cuban-American com m u
nity in US politics, where it has con
verted its influence in presidential
electoral politics into direct influ
ence on C linton’s foreign policy. M
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Reports: El Salvador

Democracy and Debris
Tricia Juhn

ince the Farabundo Marti
down, heralding the close of the
Liberation Front
Cold War era. Subsequently, negoti
(FMLN)’s first m ajor
ating teams representing the gov
offensive in January 1981,
ern m e n t of El Salvador and the
US adm inistrations have
FMLN spent 22 m onths in U nited
sought simultaneously to
Nations sponsored peace talks.
prevent a leftist takeover and to cre
These culm inated in the D ecem ber
ate space for dem ocratic institu
31, 1991 New York A greem ent, and
tions. D uring the Salvadoran civil
the ensuing cease-fire signed
war (1979-1992), the US govern
January 16, 1992, in Mexico City.
m en t provided over $6 billion in
O nce the agenda toward reconcil
m aterial assistance, over a third of
iation had been set, Am erican offi
which went directly to security
cials m aneuvered deftly to keep it
forces while supporting the political
moving, receiving ex-guerrilla lead
program s of the governing
ers in the hallowed halls of the
Christian Democrats (PDC).
Capitol and exclusive W ashington
Each o f the US presidents who
din n er clubs. Although US officials
held office during the Salvadoran
m onitored the negotiations, the
war left his mark. T he hum an
official contribution came in the
rights em phasis of the C arter
form o f cash. T he US governm ent
adm inistration gave way to security
donated $209 m illion of the estimat
priorities in El Salvador. By contin
ed $1.8 billion needed over three
ually escalating military assistance
years for a wide range of social
while ignoring death squad activity,
reform s stressing cooperation with
Ronald Reagan helped to turn El
m ultilateral organizations, particu
Salvador into a volatile partisan
larly ONUSAL (U nited Nations
issue in Congress. W hen Bush
O bserver Mission in El Salvador)
becam e president, he sought
and international finance agencies.
m ethodically to disengage the
B ush’s strategy o f dim inishing the
U nited States from El Salvador.
US profile in Salvadoran politics was
Events abroad cooperated with
m ade possible by the activism o f the
President Bush, whose inauguration
two UN secretaries general, u n d er
came only two m onths before the
whom the reform s were negotiated
election of Alfredo Cristiani, an oli
(Javier Perez de Cuellar) and then
garch from the “practical” wing of
im plem ented (Boutros Boutros
the rightist ARENA (National
G hali).
Republican Alliance) party. In
By the time Clinton took office in
Novem ber 1989, during the guerril
January 1993, the Salvadoran peace
las’ largest coordinated siege o f the
accords were alm ost one year into
capital city, the Berlin Wall came
form al im plem entation, and the
cease-fire was holding beyond any
o n e ’s best expectation. Clinton
Tricia Juhn is deputy editor of
loaded up his inter-American staff
H em isphere and a doctoral student at
with experienced Latin Americanists
the University of Miami. She is writing
(see article by Jo h an n a M endelson
her dissertation on the demilitarization
Form an) whose principal concerns
of public security in El Salvador.
in El Salvador were to provide m ate
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rial and political support for the
post-war reconstruction, culm inat
ing in the 1994 elections. Beyond
that, Clinton seized the opportunity
presented by the satisfactory
progress of the peace accords to
downplay the Salvadoran role in US
politics, so m uch so that one long
time developm ent professional in
Salvador characterized the Clinton
policy as “ru p tu re with benign
neglect.”
T he US embassy staff in-country
was tu rn ed over, so th at few, if any,
have been in-country m ore than a
year; a move which indicates that lit
tle o f what has gone on before is rel
evant now. Form er Deputy C hief of
Mission Peter Rom ero was appoint
ed to Ecuador. H e was replaced in
April 1993 by Ambassador Alan
Flanigan, the form er C hief o f the
Havana Interests Section. An accom
plished career diplom at, Flanigan’s
appointm ent is noteworthy because
he has no regional experience,
an o th er sign that the Clinton
adm inistration is not seeking to up
our ante in-country.
Clinton has m aintained US sup
po rt o f dem ocratic program s in El
Salvador, bu t unlike his three p rede
cessors, has not launched any major
political initiatives. In the post-war
era, El Salvador has gotten attention
proportionate to its role in the
inter-American system; and anything
less than the obsessive attention it
received over the last ten years m ust
feel like benign neglect.
C ontributing to this perception is
that, like the rest of the P resident’s
foreign policy, problem s arising out
o f Salvador are now resolved on a
crisis m anagem ent basis. T he long
delay in confirm ing assistant secre
tary o f inter-American affairs
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Now that the war is over, the real fighting begins

A lexander Watson, for example,
hints at a lack o f coordination at
interm ediate levels.
Central Am erican fatigue on the
Hill is credited with having created
an essentially short-sighted attitude
best sum m arized as “the peace
process is far enough along, the
elections were clean enough, we’re
o u t.” Such attitudes reflect a gener
al downplaying o f all Latin
Am erican resource com m itm ent,
although El Salvador did relatively
well, principally because o f individu
als in the adm inistration with long
standing com m itm ents to
Salvadoran outcom es.
Nevertheless, the oft-lauded
“peace dividend” has been less than
m agnanim ous: $69.1 m illion in US
aid for FY 1995, as com pared to
$230 million in FY 1993 and $94
m illion in FY 1994. US support for
the Salvadoran reconstruction is
principally disbursed through the
revam ped and re-focused USAID,
whose country strategy targets
poverty alleviation, econom ic devel
opm ent, family planning, health
care, and environm ental conserva
tion. In an about-face from previ
ous years, AID is em phasizing bot
tom up growth through m icroenter
prise, targeting single female heads
of households and their dependents
as principal beneficiaries of incom e
and em ploym ent generating pro
jects. Developm ent officials are now
less circum scribed by policy or secu
rity in their choice o f beneficiaries
and Salvadoran national counter
parts. Some non-governm ent orga
nizations (NGOs) and grassroots
associations have retained a partisan
tinge, but aid is now awarded m ore
on perform ance than politics. After
a hiatus of m ore than ten years, the

Peace Corps was to deploy its first
group o f volunteers in this year,
mostly over the central and eastern
parts of the country.
The peace accords call for a new
civilian police force and academy, a
land transfer program , and a
National R econstruction Plan to
reintegrate ex-guerrillas into civil
society. These program s, particular
ly the evolution of the new police
force and its relations with the
arm ed forces, progressed u n d er
m inute m ultilateral scrutiny.

The carelessness with
which these elections were
organized belied the
political class’s true
and deep disdain of the
average Salvadoran.

H ere too, the contribution of the
Clinton Latin Am erican team has
been to allow Salvadorans and the
UN to take the lead. R ather than
taking control o f Salvadoran politi
cal processes, the US has rem ained
a cheerful and im portant sideline
supporter. For exam ple, US person
nel in-country provide technical
and m aterial assistance to the
under-trained, under-equipped
National Civilian Police (PNC).
In a country with El Salvador’s
grim past, C linton’s most valuable
contribution has been to signal his
preference for transparency in poli
tics. The G eneral Accounting
Office (GAO) has published no less
than three reports tracking the

progress of the new civilian police
force in particular, and the peace
accords in general, but the US has
not dom inated the rem edial
process. T he Clinton adm inistra
tion also supported potentially deli
cate UN initiatives like the July 1993
release of the R eport o f the T ruth
Commission, which led to the resig
nation o f the army high com m and.
In the spring of 1994, Clinton
declassified embassy cable traffic
from the Reagan and Bush years,
which confirm ed that the US gov
ern m en t knew about form er
Minister o f Defense Rene Emilio
P once’s involvement in the 1989
m urder of six Jesuit priests, and that
President A rm ando Calderon Sol
had provided at least financial sup
p ort for death squads during the
war.
In the 1994 elections, ARENA and
a leftist coalition (of the FMLN, the
Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario,
and the Convergencia Dem ocratica),
placed first and second respectively.
T he Christian Democrats d ropped
to third place, succum bing defini
tively and publicly to intra-party fac
tionalism. A ru n off in the follow
ing m onth gave ARENA candidate
C alderon Sol (the form er mayor of
San Salvador) 68% o f the vote to
R uben Zam ora’s 32%.
Am ong the 3900 foreign observers
was a US delegation headed by US
AID director Brian Atwood. On a
National Public Radio interview fol
lowing the first round, Atwood
refuted charges that ARENA had a
calculated strategy to com m it fraud,
but did gently adm onish the
Suprem e Electoral Tribunal to cor
rect (for the run-off) the undeliv
ered carnets, nam es missing from
registration lists, 2-3 h o u r waits, cast
H em isphere • Sum mer 1994
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ing of ballots w ithout secrecy, and
the “raton loco” (crazy rat)—voters
ru n n in g around looking for the cor
rect voting center. While these elec
tions were a m arked im provem ent
over a state o f civil war, it is widely
accepted that some 70-100,000 citi
zens, many illiterate, were deprived
o f their right to vote. T he official
US delegation m ade an effort to put
the m ost optimistic face on the elec
tions, b u t others were m ore forth
right in their criticism. O ne jo u r
nalist n o ted that the “carelessness
with which these elections were
organized and then im plem ented
belied the political class’s true and
deep disdain of the average
Salvadoran.”
By acceding to elections and a
package o f procedural reform s ham 
m ered out in post-war negotiations,
the o u ter limits of extrem ist politics
moved inward, principally by forsak
ing the institutionalized application

o f violence as an arbiter o f conflict.
This was a clear victory for both
Salvadoran dem ocracy and US for
eign policy. Nonetheless, El
Salvador is living testam ent to the
lim ited ability of the U nited States
to control events, even in the small
est, weakest states. If peace and
prosperity are not forthcom ing
here—and, in the short run, they
certainly will no t be— then how to
proceed in Haiti, Cuba, or Mexico?
R econstruction in a dem ocratic
context is m ore difficult because of
the deaths from illness o f three
Salvadorans who, regardless of their
ideologies, had the virtue o f being
skilled politicians: N apoleon
Duarte, Guillerm o Ungo, and
R oberto D ’Aubuisson. Few equal to
their verve have em erged to lead El
Salvador. N either C alderon Sol’s
com m itm ent to dem ocratic reform
nor his general com petence enjoys
widespread confidence. T he FMLN

has already begun to fragm ent, and
the PDC m ust identify a m ore com 
petitive presidential candidate
(Fidel Chavez M ena has now lost
two races).
A lthough President Clinton has
been widely criticized for his timid
and tentative approach to foreign
policy challenges, this attitude may
have fom ented dem ocratization in
El Salvador as m uch as the activism
of his predecessors. C linton’s con
tribution to US-E1 Salvadoran rela
tions has offered the resources and
good offices o f the U nited States in
support o f Salvadoran and m ultilat
eral initiatives. “O u r task is to help
Salvadorans construct the kind of
society they want during an era of
scarce resources. This is a big jo b ,”
says the new regional director o f the
Peace Corps in C entral America, Vic
Johnson. “But Salvadorans them 
selves have to decide what kind of
society they want, and work for it.” ■

Rockefeller Foundation Fellowships at the University o f Florida
The Center for Latin A m erican Studies and the Center for A frican Studies in vite ju n io r and senior scholars to par
ticip a te in an in te rd iscip lin a ry program on A fro-A m e rican id e n tity and cu ltu ra l diversity in the Am ericas, in clu d in g
the C aribbean, Brazil, the US, and the sending areas o f A frica. Funded by the R ockefeller Foundation, the program
w ill enable visitin g scholars in the hum anities to spend a year or a semester at the U n iversity o f Florida to do
research in this area.
The program w ill focus on three interrelated issues in the fo llo w in g sequence: 1) 1993-94 on the intersection o f
race, class and gender; 2) 1994-95 on literature, re ligio n and po p u la r cu ltu re ; 3) 1995-96 on historical processes
o f adaptation to the physical e n viro nm ent through research on m aterial culture, ecological systems and the b u ilt
environm ent.
By February 3 ,1 9 9 5 , candidates should subm it (1) a 100 w o rd abstract, (2) an essay o f a p p roxim ate ly 1500 w ords
de ta ilin g the proposed research, (3) a fu ll c u rric u lu m vita, and (4) tw o letters o f recom m endation.
Inquiries and com pleted app lications should be addressed to Dr. H elen I. Safa, Center for Latin A m erican Studies,
U n iversity o f Florida, G ainesville, Florida 32611-2037, Fax (904) 392 -76 82, Telephone (904) 392-03 75. Fellow s
w ill be announced about A p ril 1, and w ill be expected to take up residence for the Fall semester by the end o f the
fo llo w in g August.
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Reports: US Assistance to Latin America

Update: US Assistance
Compiled by Joseph Rogers

Overall US Assistance to Select Latin American Countries
US$ (000)

BOLIVIA
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
CHILE
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
COLOMBIA
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
EL SALVADOR
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
MEXICO
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
PERU
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

ECONOMIC*

MILITARY

COUNTER DRUG

OTHER**

TOTALS

46,550
57,634
100,532
127,561
93,033

5,400
39,726
35,899
25,900
900

10,000
15,700
15,700
15,700
17,000

37,448
35,616
50,650
51,117
48,874

99,348
148,676
202,781
220,278
159,807

0
0
0
0
0

50
50
3,298
351
200

0
0
0
0
0

4,066
1,863
14,191
1,303
1,303

4,116
1,913
17,489
3,390
1,503

5,000
2,107
24,250
74,000
26,379

8,100
73,224
49,593
49,296
2,200

10,000
20,000
20,000
23,383
25,000

2,565
1,588
749
708
699

25,665
96,919
94,592
147,387
54,258

247,288
198,159
182,178
245,719
198,055

81,400
81,029
66,989
22,634
12,400

0
0
0
0
0

54,791
48,161
40,215
35,527
32,302

383,479
327,349
289,382
303,880
242,757

0
0
0
0
0

225
249
620
565
530

15,000
15,000
19,300
20,000
0

56,745
5,043
3,913
7,044
3,945

70,265
20,292
23,833
27,609
4,475

16,498
19,315
68,827
19,996
154,556

3,020
1,523
24,474
113
740

10,500
10,000
19,000
12,500
17,500

32,610
51,762
87,286
96779
88,844

62,628
82,600
199,587
129,388
261,640

Source: Latin America and the Caribbean Selected Economic and Social Data, US Agency for International Development, May 1993.
*Economic data includes Development Assistance and Economic Support Funds.
**Other category includes PL480(a), Inter-American Foundation, Trade Development Program and Peace Corps expenditures.
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Between Scylla and Charybdis
Carlos Parodi

n the past decade, US-Peru rela
tions have been tested repeated
ly by four issues: the em ergence
o f the Sendero Lum inoso
(Shining Path) guerrilla move
m ent; the proliferation of drug
trafficking; P eru's foreign debt and
econom ic crisis; and the consolida
tion of democracy, especially hum an
rights violations by security forces.
Linkages am ong these issues were
particularly evident in the co-evolu
tion of narcotrafficking and the
Sendero m ovement. More recently,
the US governm ent suspended eco
nom ic aid to P eru until hum an
rights and dem ocracy issues were
resolved in keeping with US govern
m en t expectations.

Drugs and US Policy
D uring the R eagan/B ush years,
P eru becam e a m ajor target o f US
anti-drug policies. In the US
counter-narcotics scheme, P eru fell
on the supply side o f the policy for
m ula as the w orld’s largest producer
o f coca leaves, the raw m aterial for
cocaine. While cocaine consum p
tion was addressed through educa
tion campaigns (Nancy R eagan’s
well publicized ‘Just Say N o” cam
paign, for exam ple), the supply side
was targeted through coca eradica
tion and interdiction campaigns.
T he fallout from this ineffective

Carlos Parodi teaches political science at
Illinois State University. He is the co
author, with James Malloy, of “Politics,
Equity and Social Security Policy in
Brazil, ” which appeared in Welfare,
Poverty and Developm ent in Latin
America (Christopher Abel and Colin
M. Lewis, Eds., London: Macmillan
Press, 1993).
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strategy—i.e., the Peruvian percep
tion that the livelihood of thousands
of peasant families was threatened—
led international observers to note
that US policy inadvertently
strengthened support for Sendero.
As Peruvian and US drug agents
stepped up their eradication cam
paigns, coca growers, mostly peas
ants, fled into the arm s o f the guer
rillas for protection.
With its powerful new social and
econom ic base am ong the peasants,
Sendero grew in m em bership and
m ilitary power. Its geographic area
of influence expanded and, in the
perception of many Peruvians and
foreign observers, came close to
challenging the Peruvian military
for control of the country.
S endero’s growth forced the
Peruvian military to change its strat
egy. In 1989, the highest political
and military authority of the U pper
Huallaga valley, G eneral Alberto
Arciniega, opted no t to attack the
area’s peasants, but to seek alliances
with them in an effort to com bat
Sendero. This pu t Peruvian policy
priorities into direct conflict with
W ashington’s. For Peru, defeating
Sendero had becam e the num ber
one priority; for the US, the
eradication o f coca plantations
came first. T he actions o f the
Peruvian Army were seen as, at best,
uncooperative. As a result, highranking US officials have repeatedly
accused the Peruvian military of
protecting traffickers.

Human Rights under Fujimori
Relations between P eru and the
US took a new course with the elec
tion of President Alberto Fujimori,
who took a strong stance against US
drug strategy and tu rn ed down $34

m illion in US military aid for FY
1991 to show his disapproval.
Instead o f a strategy based on police
and military repression, Fujimori
stressed the need for crop substitu
tion and alternative econom ic devel
opm ent for peasant families. In
response, the US and Peruvian gov
ernm ents signed a new anti-drug
pact in May 1991. Shortly after, how
ever, the US Congress p u t military
and econom ic aid on hold because
o f charges of hum an rights viola
tions brought against Peruvian
authorities.
George Bush was initially support
ive of Fujimori. After the Peruvian’s
official visit to W ashington in
Septem ber 1991, Bush praised
Fujim ori’s econom ic reform s and
leadership in the fight against
drugs, and urged Congress to
release funds for econom ic and mil
itary aid. Cordial relations, howev
er, were short-lived. In January
1992, US anti-drug operations were
pu t tem porarily on hold after a US
helicopter was shot down (apparent
ly by Sendero guerrillas) killing
three Americans and one Peruvian
policem an. T hen, at the 1992 San
A ntonio Summit, President Fujimori
said that US plans for crop reduc
tion, u n d er cu rren t levels of fund
ing, were unrealistic; and US anti
drug strategy a failure in general.
President Fujim ori’s decision on
April 5, 1992 to suspend the
Peruvian C onstitution, close down
Congress, and fire the country’s
judges led to a clear confrontation
with the US. W ashington's reaction
to the coup was im m ediate. In a
special m eeting of the Organization
o f Am erican States (OAS), Secretary
o f State Jam es Baker ann o u n ced the
suspension of all econom ic and mil-
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Sendero leader Abimael Guzman is in jail, but
Peru ’s problems prove more difficult to capture
itary aid to P eru until dem ocratic
institutions were reestablished.
Bilateral relations deteriorated fur
th er after Peruvian Air Force fight
ers shot down a US military trans
p o rt plane on April 24, leaving one
US crewman missing and presum ed
dead.
OAS opposition to Fujimori had
econom ic costs. Although the
Peruvian governm ent was following
the orthodoxy o f the International
M onetary Fund, the OAS’s decision
led to suspension o f disbursem ents
from the Interam erican
D evelopm ent Bank, restricting
P eru ’s access to foreign capital.
International pressure forced
Fujimori to make some concessions.
Instead of a constitution written by
notables and approved by plebiscite,
Fujimori accepted the popular elec
tion o f a Constitutional Assembly,
an idea he had initially dismissed.
T he auto-golpe also attracted the
attention of hum an rights organiza
tions. Reports o f several cases of
h um an rights violations forced the
US Congress to scrutinize the
Fujimori governm ent and to delay
the renewal of econom ic assistance.
T he Novem ber elections for the
C onstitutional Assembly, interna
tionally certified, were applauded by
W ashington officials, although some
raised concerns about Fujim ori’s
excessive influence in that body and
the judiciary. T he Bush adminis
tration showed satisfaction with the
fulfillm ent o f P eru ’s international
financial obligations but continued
to dem and an en d to hum an rights
violations.
W hen Bush left office in January
1993, relations with the US were still
tense despite international recogni
tion of P eru ’s econom ic and elec

toral initiatives. Relations were still
strained over the issue of the
downed transport plane, as well as
appropriate com pensation for the
US serviceman killed. T he latter
issue was finally settled in D ecem ber
1993, when the Peruvian govern
m ent agreed to pay $300,000 in
com pensation to the sole US vic
tim ’s family.

Internal difficulties within
Peru’s judiciary continue
to foster clashes between
the Fujimori government
and the US.

Cooling Down
In this conflictual context, Bill
C linton’s first policy statem ent came
shortly after the release o f a State
D epartm ent hum an rights report.
H e conditioned the participation of
the US in the second “Support
G roup” on an explicit com m itm ent
by the Peruvian governm ent to the
protection of hum an rights. Only
after a public statem ent by P eru ’s
Constitutional Assembly and the
Peruvian governm ent’s signing of
an agreem ent with the International
Red Cross was the financial contri
bution o f the US to the “Support
G ro up” approved. Nevertheless, the
US expressed continued concern
over unresolved cases of hum an
rights violations, raising particular
concern over the excesses of mili
tary patrols and rural self-defense
com m ittees (rondas) with rural vil
lagers and university students.
U nder Clinton, US-Peru relations

have been a m ixture o f consensus
and conflict. The Peruvian govern
m ent moved decisively on the eco
nom ic fro n t to please the in tern a
tional financial community. Foreign
debt payments were timely, invest
m ent laws were liberalized, and a
privatization program was unveiled.
By year’s end, econom ic indicators
pointed toward an econom ic recov
ery. T he weakening of Sendero,
caused mainly by the O ctober 1992
capture of Abimael Guzman, was a
crucial symbol o f P eru ’s recovery.
Critics pointed out, however, that
P eru ’s econom ic program was still
missing two im portant com ponents:
a growing export sector and a social
program to address increasing levels
o f poverty.
Politically, m unicipal elections
held in January 1993, along with the
approval o f a new constitution in an
O ctober referendum , strengthened
P eru's international image. Still,
reports of gross violations of hum an
rights, expedient military trials for
those charged with terrorism , and
the authoritarian style of the
Fujimori adm inistration inspired
doubts about President Fujim ori’s
dem ocratic credentials in
W ashington. A case that gained spe
cial notoriety was the July 1992
assassination of nine La C antuta
university students and a faculty
m em ber by security forces.
Investigations initiated by the
Peruvian Congress the following
year had to be d rop p ed after army
com m ander G eneral Nicolas
H erm oza sent tanks into the streets
to show the Army’s disapproval. In
May, Rodolfo Robles, the third high
est-ranking general in the Peruvian
Army, revealed the existence o f an
army death squad responsible for
H etnisphere • Sum mer 1994
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the assassinations o f the La C antuta
students and o th er disappearances.
This death squad, G eneral Robles
announced, was connected to the
National Intelligence Service, and
operated u n d er the direction of
intelligence advisor Vladimiro
M ontesinos.

Clinton and Peru
A lthough respect for hum an
rights and dem ocratic consolidation
rem ain its central concern, the
C linton adm inistration is willing to
cooperate with Peru. In the words
of Assistant Secretary for InterAm erican Affairs and form er US
Am bassador to Peru, Alexander
Watson, “T here rem ains legitimate
concerns about P e ru ’s vigilance in
protecting hum an rights, but we can
b etter advance o u r interests in
hum an rights by being involved
and active rath er than by withdrawing.”
Some positive developm ents seem
to indicate im provem ent in US-Peru
relations. C am paigning for P eru ’s
May 1995 presidential elections has
begun. T he recently approved
C onstitution allows the incum bent
Fujimori to ru n for a second term .
A lthough the re-election clause is
strongly contested (let us rem em ber
the C onstitution’s narrow m argin of
approval), candidates and parties
have accepted the new political real
ity and have either announced their
participation in the electoral cam
paign or are considering it. The
press rem ains free. Im prisoned
Sendero leaders are writing letters
o f reconciliation. With low inflation
and a tim id but hopeful econom ic
recovery, the political-economic cli
m ate in P eru appears to have
calmed.
A lexander Watson has played an
im portant role in conveying these
developm ents to the Clinton adm in
istration and Congress, and thereby
helped to create a new image of
P eru in W ashington. Perhaps it is
his perception which convinced the
18
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Clinton adm inistration to request
$150 m illion for P eru in the foreign
aid proposal recently sent to
Congress.
Despite the cooling-off period,
the governm ents of P eru and the
US could still easily find themselves
on a collision course. T he com plex
nature o f their relations makes a
confrontation almost inevitable. On
the econom ic front, a foreign debt
that exacts a heavy price on the
Peruvian economy still generates
plenty of potential for conflict.
More recently, P eru ’s dependence
on the financial support o f the US
for access to foreign m arkets and
capital —crucial conditions for eco
nom ic recovery— adds to the level
o f tension.
O n the political front, hum an
rights conditions and internal diffi
culties within P e ru ’s judiciary will
continue to foster clashes between
the Fujimori governm ent and the
US. T he hum an rights record of
Peru is inextricably linked to the
arm ed confrontation between the
army and the Sendero, and judging

from recent bom bings and SenderoArmy skirmishes, the guerrillas,
though weakened, have hardly been
elim inated. T he expected continua
tion o f this undeclared war will
inevitably lead the governm ents of
P eru and the US to conflicting per
ceptions of what constitutes a
hum an right violation.
Finally, US-Peru relations will con
tinue to be tested by opposing views
on drug policies. W ashington recog
nizes Lim a’s political will to act
against cocaine trafficking but also
emphasizes that no significant
progress is possible w ithout an effec
tive coca eradication campaign. The
Peruvian governm ent, in turn,
accepts participation in interdiction
operations but will no t eradicate
coca cultivation w ithout providing
alternatives for coca growers.
Funding constraints in both govern
m ents do not bode well for the suc
cess of alternative developm ent pro
grams, which, in turn, adds to the
tension and mitigates against
im proving bilateral relations in this
area. ■
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Hegemony and Partnership
Andes Franco

ssum ing that Congress
approves President
C linton's “1994 N ational
D rug C ontrol Strategy”
(h ereafter “Strategy”)
w ithout m ajor changes,
this ad m in istratio n ’s anti-drug poli
cies prom ise to have a definite
im pact on US-Colombia relations.
First, C lin to n ’s m oderate shift in
em phasis from supply reduction to
dem an d reduction ($94.3 million
for interdiction in FY 1995, down
7.3% from FY 1994) will produce
some relief in Bogota by partially
transferring the d ru g war from the
streets o f Colom bia to the US. His
strategy recognizes that “dem and
red u ctio n —including drug treat
m ent, prevention, and education—
cannot succeed if drugs are readily
available, [but it] rejects the false
choice between dem and reduction
an d law en forcem ent efforts.” T he
FY 1995 request represents a $1 bil
lion increase over last year, and
provides additional resources for
b oth supply red u ction and dem and
reduction program s.
Second, the C linton strategy pro
poses to “refocus in terd ictio n ’s
em phasis from the transit zones to
the source co u ntries,” which has
led to US dem ands for m ore vigor
ous interdiction by Colom bian
authorities p rio r to product transit.
This has p ro d u ced some anxiety in
Santafe de Bogota, which views the

Andres Franco is a graduate of the
Universidad Javeriana (Santafe de
Bogota, Colombia), working on his doc
torate in international relations at the
University of Miami.
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new interdiction strategy as a way
for the C linton adm inistration to
blam e the inevitable shortcom ings
o f the d ru g war on Colombians.

Washington objected to
the judiciary’s excessive
independence, since it
severely compromised
Washington’s ally, the
Colombian executive.

Hegemony
W ashington’s pressure on the
C olom bian judiciary to arrest and
convict m em bers o f the Cali cartel
is a m ajor source o f conflict
between the two governm ents. The
C olom bian C onstituent Assembly’s
1991 ban on extradition, com bined
with the governm ent’s unwilling
ness (despite pressure from the
D rug E nforcem ent Agency) to
em ploy m ilitary m aneuvers against
the essentially non-bellicose Cali
cartel, forced the C linton adm inis
tration to rely heavily on the prose
cutorial zeal of the C olom bian ju d i
ciary as its m ain policy tool. As
such, the scope and pace o f judicial
reform in Colom bia, m uch o f it
financed by US aid, creates some
dilem m as for Clinton.
T he first o f these is the N ational
Tribunals (form erly Courts of
Public O rder) established in 1988
to handle terrorism an d d ru g traf
ficking, and later expanded to
process political crimes. Conviction
rates in these courts approach 70%

as opposed to 10% in the regular
courts. T he system, however, is
u n d e r severe fire for ignoring
C onstitutional procedures, especial
ly those involving the rights of
defendants. T he C linton adm inis
tration has chosen to ignore the
possibility that US aid is financing a
judicial system which achieves high
conviction rates by abridging the
rights of defendants.
T he second o f W ashington’s
problem is the autonom y o f the
attorney general (fiscal general), a
residual effect o f the 1991
C onstitution, which increased the
indep en d en ce o f the ju d iciary in
general. T he attorney general may
express his legal opinions free of
political consideration, and the
vocal Gustavo de Greiff, ap p o in ted
at the tail en d of P resident Cesar
Gaviria’s term , favored legalization
to prevent traffickers from m aking
obscene profits. He also said th at
the Cali cartel had succeeded in
infiltrating C olom bia’s judiciary
an d o th er institutions. N ot only
did W ashington oppose de G reiff’s
opinions, it objected to the ju d icia
ry ’s excessive indep en d en ce in gen
eral, since it severely com prom ised
the authority o f W ashington’s ally,
the C olom bian executive.
Presumably with the encourage
m ent o f US authorities, Gustavo de
G reiff was “re tire d ” in the early
days o f the new president, E rnesto
Samper.
T he third judicial reform is the
advent o f plea bargaining in drugrelated cases. T he pro ced u re falls
u n d e r the jurisdiction o f the attor
ney general, and as expected, has
p roduced strong reactions in
W ashington. T he C linton adm inis
tration considers plea bargaining
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Washington gets its wishes and regrets the consequences

an u n helpful shift in policy and
took a dim view o f the autonom y of
the office o f p rosecutor general in
this matter. T he US D epartm ent of
Justice argued th at de G reiff was
too len ien t on the m em bers o f the
Cali cartel who proposed to su rren 
der, tu rn over some goods, and
prom ise to leave the drug business
in exchange for m inim um sen
tences, which may not be m ore
than five years. De G reiff coun
tered that to convict, C olom bia’s
ju d iciary depends alm ost exclusive
ly on the sharing o f evidence with
the US, and th at the US has with
held such evidence. US A ttorney
G eneral Ja n e t R eno responded in
El Tiempo, arguing that the US is
no t w ithholding evidence and that
it has co o perated in many cases,
even when the results in various
legal proceedings have n o t been
satisfactory for the U nited States.

Partnership
A part from anti-drug initiatives,
the C linton adm inistration has
been directly involved in three o th 
ers worth noting: the election of
Cesar Gaviria as Secretary G eneral
o f the O rganization o f Am erican
States (OAS); W ashington’s tacit
su p p o rt of C olom bia’s foreign poli
cy towards Cuba; and the possibility
o f a Colombia-US free trade agree
m ent.

The OAS
T he C linton adm inistration real
izes th at the inter-A m erican sys
tem ’s laws, procedures and organi
zations are m ore visible and
arguably m ore effective than any
tim e since 1945. With the purpose
o f revitalizing the OAS, and institu
tionalizing aspects o f US-Latin

Am erica relations in a fram ework
o f democracy, free trade, and
hum an rights, W ashington and
Santafe de Bogota launched an
u n p reced en ted hem ispheric cam 
paign to elect P resident Cesar
Gaviria as Secretary G eneral o f the
OAS. Gaviria’s dom estic and for
eign policies, and regional leader
ship skills account for W ashington’s
blessing.

Cuba
As a regional econom ic power
(with Mexico and Venezuela),
Colom bia has tried to consolidate
its political sway in the C aribbean.
W hen both Venezuela an d Mexico
were forced to shift attention from
foreign policy to dom estic turm oil,
Colom bia acquired u n p reced en ted
political influence in the
C aribbean. U nable to leave Cuba
out of any C aribbean foreign policy
initiative, Colom bia proposed a
free trade agreem ent with the
English-speaking C aribbean coun
tries, approaching nations such as
Jam aica and reestablishing diplo
matic relations with Cuba. T he US
tacitly supported Gaviria’s m eetings
with Fidel Castro, social and cultur
al cooperation agreem ents, and
econom ic transactions with Cuba.
C olom bia’s foreign policy did no t
produce a protest or a condem na
tion from W ashington, n o r did it
interfere with Gaviria’s candidacy
to the OAS.

CUFTA
CUFTA is the ultim ate objective
of C olom bia’s foreign econom ic
policy, and P resident C linton has
adm itted that Colom bia is an allur
ing candidate to jo in NAFTA in the
near future in spite o f the drug

industry. If CUFTA is instituted, it
would becom e a m ore p erm an en t,
aggressive and com prehensive
extension of W ashington’s u nilater
al A ndean Trade Preference Act
(ATPA). Approved by Congress in
1991 to reward the A ndean coun
tries for their efforts in the d ru g
war, the ATPA reduced tariff barri
ers to many C olom bian products
an d established relatively low rules
o f origin (35% ), but m aintained
tariff barriers to sensitive items
such as textiles, apparel, footwear
an d sugar, and non-tariff barriers
such as sanitary and ecological con
trols, anti-dum ping and com pen
satory rights, and additional cus
tom procedures linked to drug-traf
ficking. A ccording to Colom bian
governm ent statistics 18.5% of
C olom bian 1990 exports to the US
were subject to non-tariff barriers,
an d over 50% o f these were applied
to agricultural products (mainly
flow ers), processed food (sugar and
shrim p), textiles, apparel, and
leath er m anufactures.

Cooperation
A lthough US-Colombian relations
u n d e r C linton have established
som e channels for cooperation,
W ashington’s obsession with the
prosecution o f the m em bers of the
Cali cartel m akes C olom bia’s for
eign policy d ep e n d en t and condi
tional upon total com pliance with
US policy and objectives in the
drug war. T he authority o f the
C olom bian state appears to be as
hostage to US im peratives as to
narcoviolence, and in spite of
C olom bia’s political and econom ic
achievem ents, C linton retains many
features o f the Reagan and Bush
anti-drug policies. ■
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Reports: Chile

Chile Forecast
Alicia Frohman

n a flurry o f econom ic, politi
cal, social, and cultural
exchanges, Chilean-US rela
tions have doubtlessly intensi
fied in the 1990s. Areas o f con
currence and cooperation
include democracy, hum an rights,
nuclear non-proliferation, the politi
cal resolution o f regional conflicts,
and the convergence o f m arket
econom ies with free trade.

I

All Lined Up
A couple o f years ago, form er
interior m inister A lejandro Foxley
told an interviewer that the prob
lems in Chile-US relations resem 
bled those between the US and
France or Germany; that is, that
they consisted fundam entally of
trade matters. At the time, the
statem ent seem ed exaggerated.
However, a review of 1990-94 bilater
al issues basically confirms the truth
o f Foxley’s assertion. Many of these
issues (investment, intellectual prop
erty, the environm ent, air traffic,
agriculture, textiles) await resolu
tion, p ending inclusion in negotia
tions toward a free-trade agreem ent
(FTA). The specter of this future
negotiation, which has no t yet m ate
rialized because of bureaucratic tieups and uncertainties in
W ashington, has hovered over
Chile-US relations for four years,
preventing substantial advances on
any o th er matters.
Most of the knots in bilateral rela
tions during the last days of the

Alicia Frohman is a research associate at
the Facultad Latinoamericana de
Ciencias Sociales in Santiago de Chile.
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P inochet governm ent began to
unwind with C hile’s retu rn to dem o
cratic rule in 1990. Chile regained
the benefits o f the G eneral System
o f Preferences, US military arms
sales becam e possible once again,
and US investm ent in Chile
re tu rn ed to the fold of OPIC
(Overseas Private Investm ent
C orporation). Such initiatives were
the direct result of the retu rn to
democracy, im provem ents in hum an
rights and labor issues, as well as the
efforts of the Aylwin governm ent to
resolve the m urders of O rlando
Letelier and Ronnie Moffit. In
1976, a hit squad dispatched by
Chilean intelligence killed the two
(a Chilean and a US citizen, respec
tively), in W ashington, DC.
President B ush’s Enterprise for
the Americas Initiative, particularly
its hem ispheric free-trade com po
nent, received an early and enthusi
astic reception in Chile.
Dem ocratization and econom ic
reform seem ed to make Chile an
obvious p artn er to en ter free trade
negotiations soon. Since then, most
of the bilateral agenda has been
viewed with an eye toward an even
tual free trade agreem ent. While
W ashington’s proposals for hem i
spheric-wide trade integration lan
guished in favor of the N orth
Am erican Free Trade A greem ent
(NAFTA), the insistence o f Chilean
authorities helped keep alive the
idea o f a broader integration
scheme. W ashington gave assur
ances and reiterated its interest in
negotiating with Chile and eventual
ly o ther Latin Am erican countries,
but postponed all o th er initiatives
until after NAFTA approval. Latin
Am erican governm ents, particularly
C hile’s, confronted the then-recent-

ly installed Clinton adm inistration,
dem anding the free trade plan
prom ised on many different occa
sions by successive US adm inistra
tions. Despite innum erable declara
tions o f good intentions, in mid1994, there were no form al negotia
tions. T he U nited States has not
even defined with whom it intends
to negotiate, and w hether the cho
sen path will be NAFTA accession or
bilateral negotiations.

Clinton and Chile
C linton’s policy toward Chile and
delays in starting free-trade negotia
tions are a good exam ple of how,
despite the good will of all parties
and a lack o f contentious issues,
bureaucratic tie-ups persist when
there are no strong interest groups
intent upon elim inating them . The
result is that for Chile, a small coun
try of relative econom ic insignifi
cance to the US, inertia turns out to
be m ore powerful than political
com m itm ent.
In Latin America, m any believed
that a Democratic adm inistration
would be m ore protectionist than its
Republican predecessors. In dis
course, at least, this has not been
the case. T he Clinton adm inistra
tion has confirm ed its com m itm ent
to the dem ocratic political process,
free trade, and open markets.
Gambling its prestige and political
capital to get NAFTA approval con
stitutes an initial pass at com m ercial
integration south o f the Rio
Grande. A certain haziness regard
ing the next steps remains.
W ashington has yet to cem ent its
four-year old offer to create a hem i
spheric free trade area, for which
Chile would be a decidedly obvious
candidate.
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Santiago wants to be the next player in the FTA game

Accession
Despite the considerable geo
graphic diversification of Chilean
ex p o rt destinations, the US remains
C hile’s m ain trading partner,
accounting for approxim ately 20%
of all trade flows. This situation
explains both C hile’s interest in
reaching an agreem ent with the US,
and puts it into comparative per
spective, since Chilean trade inter
ests in o th er places (Latin America,
the E uropean Community, Asia),
are also significant.
An FTA or NAFTA accession is an
interesting possibility for a num ber
o f reasons:
• to serve as a guarantee o f the sta
bility and credibility o f the Chilean
economy;
• to create the dispute settlem ent
m echanism s th at a small country
like Chile needs;
• to p rotect Chile from arbitrary US
trade m easures or increased protec
tionism; and
• to increase exports o f processed
Chilean goods by elim inating tariff
escalation in the US.
T he negotiation of a trade agree
m ent with the US is com plem entary
to, n o t exclusive of, C hile’s activist
policy of open markets worldwide.
Chile is aware th at free trade negoti
ations with the US would have
dom estic as well as international
costs, but is also convinced that in
the m edium ru n , the benefits out
weigh the adverse effects.
As for the US, the incentives to
negotiate with Chile are almost
exclusively political. Chile is its 36th
largest trading partner, representing
less than 1% of US foreign trade.
However, to en ter negotiations
would be a signal that the US is in
fact developing a coherent policy

Chilean Foreign Trade, 1992
P ercentage o f Total

Exports

Im ports

Latin America
N orth America
European Com munity
Asia
O ther

17
17
29
31
6

25
22
19
19
15

Source: Banco C entral de Chile, Boletines Mensuales

toward Latin America that includes
rewarding — at least symbolically —
dem ocratic and econom ic reforms.
T here are no foreseeable insur
m ountable obstacles in the negotia
tions, and it seems obvious that an
open m arket like C hile’s would no t
be a problem for the US. T he per
ception that Chile is only the first of
many to gain NAFTA accession,
however, could becom e a threat to
those fearing com petition from the
larger Latin Am erican countries. At
the same time, its relatively small
econom y also m eans that there is no
great incentive to negotiate.

Pending issues
Most bilateral issues awaiting reso
lution will probably be sidelined to
give free reign to trade negotiations.
C ertain them es stand out, like intel
lectual property protection, foreign
investm ent protection and taxation,
environm ental protection, and
international air traffic. Chile has
recently passed legislation on all of
these topics, n o t entirely to the satis
faction o f the US.
O n the subject of counter-narcotics, the US has raised three con

cerns. In descending order, they
are m oney laundering, ex p o rt con
trols on input chemicals to cocaine
producing countries, and d ru g traf
ficking (although Chile is n o t cur
rently considered a high risk coun
try). US authorities have indicated
that even these subjects could be
peripheral to free-trade negotia
tions. Chile is processing legislation
on controlled substances and is
interested in greater cooperation
with W ashington on anti-drug initia
tives, conditioned on US respect for
sovereignty.
Many of these m atters will pro
ceed in a relatively expeditious m an
n er once the Clinton adm inistration
overcomes its inertia on Latin
America and unclogs the hem i
spheric free trade negotiations.
This will not magically resolve all
the problem s of the hem isphere,
b u t it will help revitalize the
reg io n ’s economies. Perhaps as
never before, in this less ideological
and m ore pragm atic era, Latin
America will not only endure, but
also derive benefits from the hege
monic proxim ity o f the U nited
States. ■
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Insider briefs on people and institutions
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs

Walmart in the Southern Cone
According to a rep o rt in
A rgentina’s Trade and Investment
Neius, W alm art plans to open two
“supercenters,” —oversized stores
th at sell retail food and m erchan
dise—an d two Sam ’s Club m em ber
ship warehouses in Buenos Aires in
1995. W almart, the US’s largest
retailer, already has a vast presence
th ro u g h o u t Mexico.

Out but Not Down
Rum ors of the im m inent departure
o f C olom bia’s controversial
A ttorney G eneral (fiscal general de la
nacion) Gustavo de Greiff, had been
circulating in Bogota even before
President E rnesto Sam per was
sworn into office on August 7. De
G reiff becam e persona non grata
after suggesting th at the legaliza
tion o f drugs should be studied, but
since leaving office he has becom e
a candidate for nearly every prom i
n e n t post available. According to
Semana, de G reiff is being consid
ered for the post of Colom bian
am bassador to the C ourt of St.
Jam es.

Marital Woes, Martial Law
W hen Susana Higuchi, the wife of
Peruvian President Alberto
Fujimori, an n o u n ced h er intention
to challenge a law forbidding presi
dential spouses from seeking high
office, reaction from the chief exec
utive was swift. H er husband

Edited by Eduardo A. Gamarra
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prom ptly fired h er as first lady,
deployed an arm ed contingent to
secure h er office, and installed iron
bars to prevent Ms. Higuchi from
re-entering it. Asked if the incident
m eant conjugal trouble, both
Fujimoris called it “merely a differ
ence in ideas.”

Brazil Tops Mexico
According to International Data
C orporation’s (IDC) Latin America
Personal Computer Markets, 1994,
regional shipm ents o f personal
com puters to Latin America
increased 22% from 1992-1993.
IDC projects that unit shipm ents of
PCs will grow at a com pound an n u 
al rate of 19.5% over five years
(1993-1998). Total PC sales in
Latin America, estim ated last year
at m ore than US$2.4 billion, are
projected to double over the same
period. In 1993, Brazil’s PC m arket
grew by m ore than 34%, or 480,000
units, m aking it the reg io n ’s largest
national m arket for PC sales.
Mexico still com m ands the highest
m arket value, however. Latin
American Personal Computer Markets,
1994 is a six-country study (Mexico,
Brazil, A rgentina, Chile, Venezuela,
Colombia) based on m onths of
field research and interviews. It
can be purchased by contacting
Eric P rothero, IDC’s M anager of
Latin A m erican Research, at 415962-6463.

Going Somewhere?
Any travel plans to Latin America
and the C aribbean in the near
future may w arrant some m odifica
tion. In late August, following
heavy pressure from consum er

groups, the US D epartm ent of
T ransportation released the nam es
of nine countries identified as hav
ing inadequate governm ent super
vision o f air safety. Airlines from
Belize, the Dom inican Republic,
H onduras, N icaragua, Paraguay,
and U ruguay are b arred from land
ing at US airports. Bolivia, El
Salvador, Guatem ala, and the Dutch
Antilles were granted conditional
approval only.

A Monument to Corruption
O n S eptem ber 3, 1994, A rgentine
president Carlos M enem inaugurat
ed the first o f the Yacyreta hydro
electric d am ’s twenty turbines.
Yacyreta, which M enem once
described as A rgentina’s “m o n u 
m ent to co rru p tio n ,” is ru n n in g
over six times the initial budget and
rem ains unfinished after eleven
years o f construction.

Coca Is It
O nce outspoken opponents of US
counternarcotics policies in Bolivia,
Vice President Victor Hugo
Cardenas, the first Aymara to reach
high office, and Foreign M inister
A ntonio A ranibar o f the leftist
Movimiento Bolivia Libre have found
themselves in a difficult position
lately. In Septem ber, thousands of
peasants from the coca growing
regions o f the country— mainly
indigenous people—m arched on La
Paz dem anding that the govern
m ent respect their right to grow
coca and that security agencies be
held responsible for alleged hum an
rights violations in the C hapare
Valley. T he governm ent was unsuc
cessful in disbanding the m archers

F

and was forced to negotiate in
o rd er to forestall a violent con
frontations with security forces. As
high ranking governm ent officials,
C ardenas and A ranibar have been
forced to defend the official policy
o f ordering the army into coca
growing regions and supporting the
eradication o f the bush.

24-Hour News Boom
O nce the only 24-hour news show
in Latin America, CNN faces stiff
com petition these days. SUR p ro
vides a ‘round-the-clock relay of
local newscasts from A rgentina to
Mexico. T he regional headquarters
of b oth ECO (Mexico) and NBC are
now in Miami. Telenoticias is the new
kid on the block; a consortium of
Miami-based Telemundo G roup Inc.,
Reuters, A rtear (A rgentina), Antena
3 International (Spain), and
Productora y Comertializadora de
Television (M exico). Telenoticias
plans to be up in tim e for the
Sum m it o f the Americas, and will
broadcast to Spain, Latin America,
and a few select regions o f the
U nited States.

I
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tion charges. Ecuadoran president
Sixto D uran Ballen, has had to
defend him self from accusations of
nepotism . Fighting co rru p tio n has
becom e fashionable in the region.
F orm er governm ent officials from
every country have been eagerly
signing up as m em bers of
Transparency International, an
international agency m odeled on
Amnesty International, to m onitor
charges o f corruption in Latin
Am erica an d elsewhere.

lowed several bags o f cocaine. After
searching his bags he was h an d 
cuffed and taken to Jackson
M em orial Hospital for x-rays, which
confirm ed his innocence. Rojas’s
story, broadcast by Radio Caracol,
struck a familiar chord with several
Colom bian nationals who claim ed
similar treatm ent by Customs
inspectors at the Miami
International airport. Customs offi
cials defend their actions an d claim
a “low” 25 percent rate o f error.

No Surprises Here

Gallup Arrives in Miami

According to the Economic
Commission for Latin America
(ECIA /CEPA L), Latin Am erica as a
region has grown at a m oderate
three percent rate for the past four
years, kept inflation in check, but
has been incapable o f dealing with
unem ploym ent. P eru leads the
region with eight percent growth
followed by A rgentina at six, and
Bolivia, Chile, C olom bia and Costa
Rica at about four percent. The
news is less optimistic about
Venezuela, Haiti, and H onduras,
whose gross dom estic products are
expected to fall in 1994.

Citing quick access to growing
dem and in Latin America, the
international firm of Gallup
Am erica Latina recently moved its
regional headquarters to Miami.
T he public opinion pollster arrived
in August, an d is expected to play a
m ajor forecasting role in several
upcom ing elections. T he firm ’s
regional president is Gabriel
Gonzalez Molina. Requests for
inform ation can be faxed to (305)
594-9272.

Fighting Corruption
Below the Belt
South A m erican presidents o f late
have had a very difficult tim e keep
ing the lid on co rru p tio n scandals.
T h ree fo rm er presidents F ernando
Collor de Mello (Brazil), Alan
Garcia (Peru) and Jaim e Paz
Zam ora (Bolivia) have seen their
political careers cut short by allega
tions o f em bezzlem ent and connec
tions to d ru g cartels. Form er presi
d en t Carlos A ndres Perez
(Venezuela) has been fighting for
his political life, also against co rru p 

E

Form er superflyweight world cham 
pion, C olom bian Baby Sugar Rojas,
took a low blow from the US
Customs at Miami International
A irport last September.
E ncouraged by the re tu rn of so
many aging boxers, Rojas decided
to travel to Miami to begin training
for a possible com eback. His plans
were postponed, however, when
Customs inspectors held him for
hours on suspicion o f having swal

Detective Story
Kroll Associates Inc., the w orld’s
largest corporate investigative firm ,
has also moved its regional head
quarters to Miami. Kroll’s investiga
tors are reputed to have tracked
down the hidden fortu n e o f Jean
Claude Duvalier, uncovered the link
between (form er Peruvian presi
dent) Alan Garcia and BCCI, and
recovered m onies sm uggled out of
Brazil by an aide to (ousted presi
dent) F ernando Collor de Mello.
T he firm has expanded into resolv
ing kidnappings and identifying the
sources of illicit fortunes. ■
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“Continuismo” or Convergence?
Johanna Mendelson Forman

oreign policy will play
almost no role in the 1996
re-election campaign. A
strong economy, low infla
tion, and delivering on
dom estic campaign prom is
es like health care will determ ine
the success o f the country’s first
Democratic adm inistration in twelve
years. B arring military invasion or
coup, Latin America and the
Caribbean fall off the radar screen
to all but the most fervent junkies of
hem ispheric affairs. Fortunately for
Clinton, the region, save Haiti and
Cuba, has never been so democratic.
Gnawing problem s of hum an
rights violations in Haiti, Colombia,
Peru, and Guatemala, and the
u nabated narcotics trade persist, but
even the m ore skeptical pundits,
while questioning the m erits of a
“new p artn ersh ip ”, adm it that
W ashington’s relationship with its
Latin Am erican neighbors is no
longer business as usual (See
A braham Lowenthal, “Latin
America: Ready for Partnership?”
Foreign Affairs, v72, n l (1993), pp.
74-92). Over the long term , howev
er, the im plications for a less activist
role may be m ore troublesom e.

F

Democracy and Human Rights
At m id-term , what has the Clinton
adm inistration done to carve out its
own policy niche in the hem isphere?
In one of his first presidential for-

Johanna Mendelson Forman is currently
serving as a senior advisor to the Office of
Democratic Initiatives in the US Agency
for International Development. The views
expressed in this article are the personal
opinions of the author and not those of the
Agency for Internatiorial Development.
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eign policy addresses, Clinton stated
that “our security and prosperity will
be greatly affected in the years
ahead by how many of these nations
can becom e and stay dem ocracies.”
T he adm inistration etched out a tri
partite policy em bracing democracy
and respect for hum an rights,
regional security, and free trade as
the bases on which the U nited
States will engage o ther nations:
dem ocratization is the ticket to
n o rth ern markets. In just u n d er
two years, foreign policy term inolo-

Lessoris learned take on
new meaning in a world
where democracy is no
longer pitted against
a communist enemy.
gy has shifted from such cold war
concepts as “threats” and “wars
against drugs” to "partnership”,
“refo rm ”, “symmetry”, “good gover
n an ce”, and a “substantive symme
try” that R ichard Feinberg, Special
Assistant to the President at the
National Security Council, defines
as “a similar agenda rooted in
the [ir] com m on participation in the
one-worlcl economy.” Early on, for
m er Deputy Secretary of State
Clifton W harton suggested
“Too often in our history, we have
tu rn ed our attention to Latin
America in times of crisis, and we
have tu rn ed o u r back when the cri
sis passes. T hat is short-sighted and
self-defeating. This A dm inistration
will not make that mistake.
President Clinton is com m itted to

forging a true partnership of the
Americas-a W estern H em isphere
com m unity of dem ocracies— to
strengthen dem ocratic institutions,
to defend hum an rights, to fight for
social justice, to support econom ic
reform and free markets, and to
protect the environm ent. And let
there be no doubt: We will build a
hem isphere o f free trad e.”

The Bush Legacy
Also evident at m id-term is an ele
m ent of “continuism o,” m ost obvi
ously regarding US im m igration
policy toward Haiti and the Bush
counternarcotics strategy (although
Congress is no longer willing to
fund eradication program s with
Cadillac price tags) and the incor
poration o f sustainable develop
m ent, a concept m ore friendly to
such constituencies as environm en
tal groups and o th er non-governm ental organizations (NGOs).
A nother m anifestation of con
tinuism o is the renew ed focus on
hum an rights, a throwback to the
C arter years. Many foreign policy
makers, from the Secretary o f State
down, served u n d er President
Carter, and lessons learned then
take on new m eaning in a world
where dem ocracy is no longer pit
ted against a com m unist enemy. A
pragm atic approach to hum an
rights has given the subject m ore
consistent policy guidance.
Moreover, C linton’s m essengers are
people who have earn ed high credi
bility as advocates. They include a
form er ACLU legislative counsel,
Assistant Secretary o f State for
H um an Rights and H um anitarian
Affairs, Jo h n Shattuck, and a form er
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
H um an Rights, Mark Schneider,
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who is currently the Assistant
A dm inistrator for Latin America
and the Caribbean at the Agency
for International Development.

Haiti
Nowhere m ore than in Haiti has
Clinton failed. Clinton, the candi
date, cam paigned against the Bush
adm inistration’s policy o f forced
repatriation of boat people.
Clinton, the president, im mediately
did an about-face on this policy
once the realities o f a massive influx
o f indigent Haitians hit the con
sciousness o f the US electorate.
Haiti was an opportunity to undergircl democracy, econom ic security,
and respect for hum an rights by
unilateral action. Now the options
are limited and one possible out
come, a m ultilateral occupation
gone awry, could force our new part
nership with the region to unravel.
Haiti will certainly test the ability of
the US to determ ine the criteria for
the use of force to restore dem ocra
cy and oust coupmakers.

Counternarcotics
In this area, m ore is less. The
A ndean Initiative of the Bush
adm inistration, the war on drugs
enshrined in the Declaration of San
A ntonio, has becom e only one of
the 'new determ inants of global
security.’ After peacekeeping,
nuclear non-proliferation and sus
tainable developm ent, and ahead of
terrorism , the international drug
trade ranks am ong the new post
cold war security threats, at least
according to US State D epartm ent
C ounselor Tim W irth. T he implica
tions o f this for regional security are
troublesom e, given the undue
em phasis Bush allowed the

D epartm ent o f Defense to place on
the drug war as a key regional mili
tary mission. While the Clinton
adm inistration’s approach to this
subject is m ore com plex, there is
m uch room for creativity. Ironically,
one o f the most successful of alter
native developm ent products to
em erge as a replacem ent to coca
has been tobacco, a situation that
could pit the anti-smoking, anti
tobacco Clinton against the forces
of counternarcotics policy.

A multilateral occupation
gone awry in Haiti could
force our new partnership
ufith the region to unravel.

NAFTA
Having pledged his support for
NAFTA passage late in the presiden
tial campaign, the Clinton White
H ouse geared up for a down-to-thefinish-line battle for ratification.
NAFTA cost Clinton lots o f political
capital with traditional Democratic
allies in labor. Much to the credit
of Vice President A1 Gore, the pub
lic debate over NAFTA probably
constituted Latin A m erica’s fifteen
m inutes of fame. Clinton m ade
NAFTA into a political test, no t only
o f his muscle in Congress, bu t also
his ability to translate dom estic con
cerns into substantive foreign policy.
For Latin Americans, NAFTA's ratifi
cation reinforced the Clinton
adm inistration’s com m itm ent to
support progress in expanding free
trade and reducing tariffs, while
also prom oting regional integration.

At the April inauguration of
President E duardo Frei o f Chile, it
was no coincidence that U nited
States Trade Commissioner,
Ambassador Mickey Kantor, led the
US delegation to Santiago. T he sig
nals for fast-track trade treaties are
sounding loud and clear. Clinton
may very well expand the NAFTA to
the S outhern Cone before the end
of 1994. This is no longer the
empty rhetoric of the Bush adm inis
tratio n ’s Enterprise for the
A m erica’s initiative, but rath er the
pragm atic push of a new approach
to regional developm ent.

New Actors and New Visions
T he personnel issue within the new
adm inistration’s Latin America shop
started with a trem endous battle
which brought Cuba to the fore.
Clinton nom inated Mario Baeza, a
Cuban-American lawyer from New
York as Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs. For
weeks the new adm inistration faced
the wrath of the Cuban-American
lobby, as it cranked up its political
m achine to show a young president
who really ran the show in this area.
T he adm inistration withdrew Baeza,
as it seem ed that no HispanicAm erican, or even a liberal with aca
dem ic credentials, could m eet the
test o f the Cuban-American
N ational Foundation. In the end,
cold warriors accepted A lexander F.
Watson as a com prom ise candidate.
A skilled career diplom at, Watson
has helped to bridge the gap
between continuism o and conver
gence.
P art of the adm inistration’s Latin
Am erican policy comes from
Convergence and Community: The
Americas in 1993, a rep o rt of the
H em isphere • Sum m er 1994
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Inter-American Dialogue produced
m onths before the inauguration.
Its language becam e the m antra
of State D epartm ent and National
Security Council spokespeople as
they articulated the new vision of
the US-Latin America relationship.
In a lofty series o f policy recom m en
dations, the rep o rt envisioned its
three m ain areas o f interest to cre
ate a guiding light for the president
elect by pushing hem ispheric eco
nom ic integration, the collective
defense of democracy, and poverty
alleviation as the principle objec
tives of a new policy dialogue with
regional leaders. T he m ultilateral
n ature of the proposals reflected
the approach of many o f the m ore
liberal scholars and policy makers
who had developed these them es in
publications and research of their
own. T he new adm inistration also
drew some o f its key personnel from
the D ialogue’s staff and board, most
notably form er Dialogue president
R ichard E. Feinberg, and Sally
Shelton, now the new Assistant
A dm inistrator of USAID’s Global
Bureau.
O th er personnel choices include
A rturo Valenzuela, the Deputy
Assistant Secretary for InterAm erican Affairs, who manages
dem ocracy and Mexican issues.
Valenzuela, an accom plished schol
ar of dem ocratic transitions, is
invaluable to the US governm ent in
the face of the ongoing Mexican
dram a. T he January uprising in
Chiapas and the M arch m urder of
the PRI's presidential candidate,
Luis D onaldo Colosio, com bined
with expanding pressures for
authentic pluralism, make a cool
head and an understanding of polit
ical change critical at this juncture.
Personnel changes at the
O rganization of Am erican States
also reflect the new m ultilateralism.
The OAS has been repeatedly tested
as a new tool in regional diplomacy.
B eginning in the Bush adm inistra
tion, and even m ore so u n d er
28
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C linton’s lead, the OAS has been
given a mission which will make it
an ever m ore im portant tool in our
options. T he selection of H arriet
Babbitt as US Ambassador provided
a signal of the adm inistration’s
desire to pu t political muscle
behind its appointm ent. An attor
ney, Babbitt has translated an inter
est in the region and friendship
with the Clintons into an advantage
for the institution. US support of
Colombian President Cesar Gaviria
over Costa Rica’s form er foreign
m inister B ernard N iehaus m arked a
turning point in the US approach to
OAS leadership, signaling a new
com m itm ent to strong hem ispheric
leadership at a once m oribund orga
nization. During attempts to under
m ine freely elected governments,

Whether an unimperial
president can lead the way
both at home and abroad
will be tested by the stability
of our hemisphere.
such as the autogolpe in Peru, the
Serranazo in Guatemala and the
rum ors of a restive military in
Venezuela, the Clinton administra
tion used the OAS to signal that such
actions can no longer be tolerated in
a “community of dem ocracies.”

Old Issues, New Challenges
Central America, the festering
w ound of US foreign policy during
the Reagan years, is healing, thanks
to the benign neglect o f the Bush
adm inistration, the end of east-west
rivalries, and continuing com m it
m ent from a Democratic president
to close this sad chapter of hem i
spheric relations. Foreign aid levels
are declining but target Salvador
peace accords and support for
Guatem alan negotiations. Despite
elections, Nicaragua rem ains a

diplom atic nightm are because of
continuing political factionalism
and predom inance of Sandinistas
in the state security apparatus. In
Panam a, the presidential assump
tion by M anuel N oriega’s political
heirs presents the Clinton adm inis
tration with a test o f o ur com m it
m ent to the process.
W hat is different about C linton’s
approach to the region? The
changes are subtle: a distinct
change in the tone and feel of for
eign policy; a new role for NGOs in
the decision-making process.
H um an rights policy is discussed
with m utual respect rath er than
m utual hostility. C linton’s trials will
ultimately center on a few issues:
our ability to rem ain cool as events
unfold in Mexico, preparing a postCold War Cuba policy constrained
by domestic politics, and developing
a new relationship with the reg io n ’s
military which bolsters civilian con
trol w ithout jeopardizing regional
security.
C linton’s reaction to the political
instability in Mexico above all
dem onstrated respect for the
Salinas governm ent, dramatically
underscored when m inutes after the
March assassination of PRI (Partido
Revolucionario Institucional) presi
dential candidate Luis Donaldo
Colosio, Clinton ordered the
Treasury D epartm ent to provide an
em ergency short term loan guaran
tee to support the peso to prevent
disruption o f Mexican financial
markets. Post-cold war relations
with Cuba have been m ore trouble
some. Even a hint of a shift in poli
cy, such as the recent overturning of
the US trade em bargo toward
Vietnam, ch u rn ed up the waters in
the Cuban Am erican community,
though the fissures in solidarity are
becom ing m ore apparent.
How Clinton directs the missions
o f the US military toward the hem i
sphere will indicate w hether we
approach our neighbors as p artn er
or hegem on. W hether we aid and
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abet Latin Am erican militaries in
their quest for new missions will cer
tainly be influenced by US
approaches to counternarcotics ini
tiatives and Latin American enthusi
asm for U nited Nations peacekeep
ing operations. The removal o f the
S outhern C om m and from Panam a
will be the final symbol o f US mili
tary dom ination yielding to the
m ore im portant trading partnership
that will shape US-Latin American
relations well into the 21st century.
T he Sum m it o f the Americas,
scheduled for D ecem ber 9-10, 1994
in Miami, will m irro r the ones
already familiar to those following
the adm inistration’s “newspeak”:
good governance, dem ocracy and
free trade. An im portant departure
o f this adm inistration is its willing
ness to address corruption, a propi
tious decision since, following the
departures o f Carlos Andres Perez
and F ernando Collor, Latin
Am erican governm ents appear to
be m ore sensitive to dem ands for
clean governm ent.
A convergence o f interests
between the US and Latin America
will ultimately help distinguish this
adm inistration’s approach to the
region. Its success will be m easured
by the continued proliferation of
elected dem ocratic governments,
the accession o f additional m em bers
into NAFTA, and the im proved
enfranchisem ent of Latin
Am ericans in their own lands. This
will take extraordinary com m it
m ent, n o t only from the US but also
from the international financial
institutions, to develop program s
that address the alleviation of
extrem e poverty, while sim ultane
ously prom oting structural reform .
W hether an unim perial president
can lead the way both at hom e and
abroad will be tested by the stability
o f o u r hem isphere, both in econom 
ics and politics. Certainly, C linton’s
ability to succeed in the hem isphere
begins with his ability to rem ain a
leader at hom e. ■

T R A N S A C T I O N

Journal of Interamerican Studies
and World Affairs
Recent Articles include:
JOURNAL OF

INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND WORLD AFFAIRS

Unprecedented Disparities, Unparalleled
Adjustments Needs: Winners and
Losers on the NAFTA Fast Track
Michael E. Conroy and Amy Glasmeier

Volume 34. Number 1________________________________ Spring 1992

T he Political Im pact o f Free Trade on M exico
P eter H. Smith
Political R eform ism in M exico: Salinas at the Brink
Stephen D. M orris
International Integration and D em ocratic D evelopm ent:
T h e C ases o f P oland and M exico
Judith Gentlem an and Voytek Zuhek
T he FSL N after the Debacle:
T he Struggle fo r the D efinition o f S andinism o
Andrea Perez

Capitalist Regime Loyalties and
Redemocratization in Chile
Eduardo Silva

The Commonwealth Caribbean in the
New World Order: Between Europe and
North America?
Anthony J. Payne and Paul K. Sutton

Technology, the M ilitary, and D em ocracy in Brazil
Ken Conca
E conom ic Reform in F our C entral A m erican C ountries:
Patterns and Lessons Learned
Juan J. Buttari____________________________________
BO O K S REC EIV ED __________________________________

Jaime Suchlicki

Why the Illegal Psychoactive Drugs
Industry Grew in Colombia
Francisco E. Thoumi

Quest for Integrity: The Mexican-US
Drug Issue in the 1980s
Peter Reuter and David Ronfeldt

EDITOR

University of Miami

Journal of Interamerican Studies
and World Affairs offers thought
ful, perceptive articles on con
temporary issues and problems
affecting the interrelationship of
countries within the Western
Hemisphere. It focuses on the
political, social and economic
situation of all of the countries in
Latin America, with special
attention to Latin American for
eign policies

Published Quarterly
A publication of the North-South Center
of the University of Miami

Subscription Rates:
Individuals: $42/yr; $80/2yrs; $108/3yrs
Institutions: $80/yr; $144/2yrs; $192/3yrs
Domestic first-class add $24/yr
Foreign surface mail add $24/yr
Foreign airmail add $44/yr
(Rates subject to change annually)

Transaction Publishers
Department JIS
Rutgers-The State University
m
transaction New Brunswick, NJ 08903

H em isphere • Sum mer 1994

Features: Clinton and the Western Hemisphere

All For One. One For All
Ronald W. Cox

he end of the Cold War
and the occurrence of
recessions in Japan and
the E uropean Com munity
(EC) provide the context
for understanding the
Clinton A dm inistration’s econom ic
policies in Latin America. Like
President Bush, Clinton is looking
toward the W estern H em isphere to
bolster the competitive position of
the US in the global economy. Both
adm inistrations placed the N orth
Am erican Free Trade A greem ent
(NAFTA) at the center o f their
Latin Am erican agenda.
With NAFTA as the base, the
Clinton team is drafting a plan to
create a W estern H em isphere freetrade zone, with Chile in tended as
the next m ember. The plan, which
has a tim etable of 10-15 years, seeks
to lower trade barriers and dism an
tle governm ental regulations block
ing foreign investm ent and trade in
the hem isphere. O ne possible sce
nario for the trade plan is for the
US to negotiate one at a time with
each prospective m em ber of the
free-trade zone. A nother is for the
adm inistration to organize the trade
pact “cluster by cluster,” with region
al free-trade groups such as
Mercosur, which consists o f Brazil,
A rgentina, U ruguay and Paraguay,
negotiating to en ter all at once in
exchange for elim inating trade and
investm ent restrictions.

T

Ronald W. Cox is assistant professor of
political science at Florida International
University. His most recent luork is
Power and Profits: US Policy in
Central America, University of
Kentucky Press, 1994.
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In launching its hem ispheric freetrade zone, the Clinton adm inistra
tion hopes to build on its percep
tion o f favorable recent trends.
First, with lower tariffs, US exports
to Latin America rose 27 percent in
1992. Second, Latin America and
Europe were the only two regions of
the world where the US had trade
surpluses last year. These develop
m ents have em erged on the heels of
the difficult conditions that Latin
Am erican countries faced in the
1980s, when capital and resources
flowed outward from the region,
resulting in negative econom ic
growth rates.

Clinton’s policy statements
focus on trade and
investment to the
exclusion of any discussion
on the increasing
maldistribution of
wealth in the region.
In fact, the econom ic circum 
stances of the 1980s m ade Latin
American governm ents— increasing
ly dom inated by a new group of
m arket-oriented economists and
finance ministers—m ore willing to
proceed with severe austerity m ea
sures to pay off their debts. W hat
some have called the “lost decade of
the 1980s” led to moves to liberalize
trade and privatize industries, which
gave the US greater leverage in pro
m oting exports and foreign invest
m ent. At the same time, social pro
grams, including education and
health care, were gutted while mal

nutrition and hunger increased.
T he num ber of people living in
poverty increased by 39%, or 71 mil
lion people, over the 1980s.
T he striking aspect of C linton’s
policy statem ents is that they focus
on trade and investm ent to the
exclusion of any discussion on the
increasing m aldistribution of wealth
in the region. Like Bush, C linton’s
em phasis has to prom ote NAFTA
and hem ispheric free-trade as the
centerpiece for econom ic recovery.
This is evident from a recent report
issued by the Inter-American
Dialogue, a m oderate think tank
founded in the early 1980s to ana
lyze Latin Am erican affairs by a
num ber o f the adm inistration’s key
personnel on Latin Am erican issues
(See article by Jo h a n n a M endelson
F orm an).
The 1993 report, Convergence and
Continuity: The Americas in 1993,
places first priority on the ratifica
tion o f NAFTA and on progress
toward a hem ispheric trade agree
m ent. F urtherm ore, the report
stresses continuity in foreign eco
nom ic policy by em phasizing the
im portance of keeping governm ent
spending low and m inim izing gov
ern m en t intervention in the Latin
American economies. These m ea
sures are regarded as the best way to
deal with poverty in the region.
T he rep o rt argues for a “collective
defense o f democracy,” but offers
little new in the way of proposals for
advancing dem ocratic institutions in
the hem isphere. In fact, Richard
Feinberg has argued that the open
ing of trade and investm ent and the
prospects for dem ocratic consolida
tion are tied together: “If a society
fundam entally disagrees on funda
m ental issues— the nature o f p ro p 
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To improve US competitiveness in a global
economy Clinton turns to Latin America
erty and what constitutes a legiti
mate political system— democracy
can ’t handle it. If people agree on
what constitutes good politics and
good economics, the preconditions
for democracy are in place.” (quoted
by Doug Henwood in NACLA Report
on the Americas, 26:5 (1993), p. 24).
Part o f the continuity between the
Bush and Clinton policies can be
explained by structural factors.
These include the end o f the Cold
War, the econom ic com petition
between the US, Japan, and the EC
in the 1980s; the recessions in Japan
and E urope in the 1990s; and the
econom ic conditions faced by Latin
Am erican governm ents throughout
the 1980s, which m ade Latin
America m ore open to reducing
trade and investm ent restrictions.
These factors pushed Bush and
Clinton away from military spend
ing and toward trade and invest
m ent initiatives in Latin America.
A nother reason for the BushClinton continuity is the form ation
o f business lobbying groups that are
com m itted to securing greater
regional trade with and investm ent
in Latin America. Such lobbying
groups have worked closely with
both Bush and Clinton, and even
helped to draft sections of the
NAFTA agreem ent. Led by bank
ing, financial services, telecom m uni
cations, autom obiles, electronics,
and some textile firms, US indus
tries jo in ed with Mexican firms as
early as 1986 to form the MexicanUS Business Council to lobby for
NAFTA. Now some o f the most
competitive and export-oriented US
industries are pushing for a hem i
sphere wide trade agreem ent.
Yet business supporters o f NAFTA
disagree on the reasons for pursu

ing NAFTA, which could pose diffi
culties for C linton’s plan to pro
mote a hem ispheric trade agree
m ent. Export-oriented and com peti
tive US investors in banking, finan
cial services, retailing, and telecom 
m unications prom oted an agree
m ent that was free of trade barriers
and discrim inatory investm ent pro-

Business supporters of
NAFTA disagree on the
reasons for pursuing it,
which could pose
difficulties for a Clinton
plan to promote a hemi
spheric trade agreement.
visions. These firms valued NAFTA
for its relaxation of trade and invest
m ent constraints between Mexico
and the U nited States. T heir coun
terparts in electronics, autos, and
international textile firms saw
NAFTA as regional protection
against Jap an and Western Europe.
In fact, form er trade negotiator
Ernest Preeg labeled the investm ent
provisions of NAFTA "high-tech”
regionalism to highlight its depar
ture from the m ultilateralism of the
General A greem ent on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT).
Regional free-trade agreem ents
have been allowed u n d er the GATT.
Nonetheless, NAFTA goes beyond
the intentions of the GATT provi
sions in a num ber of ways. First, the
NAFTA provisions on rules o f origin
are explicitly designed to limit
Japanese and o ther foreign direct
investm ent in Mexico in autom o

biles, com puters, and o th er hightechnology sectors. GATT allows
rules o f origins agreem ents only to
prevent circum vention of tariff bar
riers by a third party th at exports
products to a low-duty country in
o rd er to bypass the tariffs of a highduty country. T he NAFTA provi
sions go beyond preventing tariff
circum vention by establishing high
rules o f origin standards, narrowly
drawn definitions o f value added
requirem ents, and penalties for late
entrants into the regional market.
The divisions am ong corporate
supporters o f NAFTA may have
im portant im plications for Clinton
efforts to gain dom estic support for
this trade agenda. A wide range of
US business interests supported
NAFTA for diverse reasons, from its
provisions increasing trade and
investments to its restrictions on
global com petitors for the N orth
Am erican market. In addition, US
exports to Mexico soared to $41.6
billion in 1993, which placed
Mexico behind only C anada and
Japan as a m arket for US goods and
services. Thus, m ore US business
interests had a stake in lobbying for
NAFTA than is the case with Chile
or o th er Latin Am erican countries.
In order to secure its agenda, the
Clinton team m ust guard against
the possibility o f business opposition
to a hem ispheric trade zone, espe
cially if business firms perceive the
plan as undercutting their com peti
tive position in the N orth American
market.
Clinton policy may also face prob
lems on o ther fronts, with some
adm inistration officials insisting that
the hem ispheric trade initiative
should be pursued slowly in o rd er
to deal m ore effectively with trade
H em isphere
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disputes with Jap an and Western
Europe. In a recent internal White
House m em o obtained by the New
York Times, there was even some con
cern th at Mexico would ally itself
with the next en tra n t into the freetrade pact in an effort to prevent
the US and C anada from proceed
ing with their plans for a giant freetrade area. A lthough Mexican offi
cials denied this, the W hite House
has already suggested ways to get
around future objections by giving
the US, Mexico and C anada equal
votes on decisions to expand the
pact, while future entrants would
m erely receive votes based on the
volume of their trade.
A nother obstacle to the Clinton
agenda is the potential opposition
of organized labor and environm en
tal groups, both at hom e and
abroad, to US plans for increased
trade and investm ent opportunities.
T he Clinton team felt obligated to
attach labor and environm ental side
agreem ents to NAFTA in an effort
to appease dom estic critics. The
side agreem ent on labor provides
for the creation o f a US-MexicanCanadian commission based in
Dallas, with an executive director
and staff o f about 15. T he p an el’s
budget for 1995 will be about $3
m illion and will be devoted to
retraining and incom e support for
workers at com panies that have
moved their operations to Mexico
since NAFTA went into effect on
Jan u ary 1, 1994.
Many critics within the US labor
m ovem ent, however, see the side
agreem ents as woefully deficient in
protecting US workers h u rt by the
agreem ent. F urtherm ore, m ost
Mexican unions opposed NAFTA
even with the side agreem ents, argu
ing that it would do nothing to
improve the conditions faced by
Mexican workers, whose wages
declined steadily in US owned
assembly plants during the 1980s.
Mexican workers in the auto sector
have been attem pting to form
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dem ocratic unions by breaking away
from the governm ent-controlled
Confederacion de Trabajadores
M exicanos (CTM ). At the same
time, US firms have worked with the
Mexican state to control and, at
times, to prohibit dem ocratic union
organization in Mexico.
For example, Ford, General
Motors (GM), and Chrysler have
shifted the principal location of
autom obile production from
Mexico City to export-oriented m an
ufacturing facilities in central and
n o rth ern Mexico. T he relocation
was based on three interrelated fac
tors: the export incentives prom ot
ed by the Mexican governm ent, the
virtual absence of independent
labor organizations in the new loca
tions, and the opportunities to
restructure capital-labor relations
on term s m ore favorable to capital.
W here possible, firms preferred to
deal with the relatively conservative
CTM.
The actions o f US auto firms have
resulted in increasing conflict
between the Big T hree and dem oc
ratic unions in Mexico. GM used its
political leverage to ensure that its

engine and autom obile plants at
Ramos Arizpe were closed to dem o
cratic unions. In 1980, the dem oc
ratic union at GM’s Federal District
plant fought a 106-day strike (the
longest in Mexican history) for the
right to represent workers at the
n o rth ern GM plants. According to
political scientist Kevin
M iddlebrook, GM m anagem ent,
with the cooperation of CTM
unions and the Mexican govern
m ent, won the battle, ensuring that
the unions at Ramos Arizpe would
be controlled by the CTM.
The international labor conflicts
around NAFTA could be repeated
in o ther contexts, as the Clinton
adm inistration prepares to expand
the free-trade agreem ent on a
hem ispheric basis. Along the way,
expect US labor groups to insist, at
a m inim um , upon protection for
their m em bership in future trade
agreem ents. T he extent to which
US labor groups form alliance’s
with their international counter
parts abroad is key to how m uch
leverage they will eventually have
over the future of labor and m an
agem ent. I
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The Drug War is Dead...
Peter Andreas and Kate Doyle

andidate Clinton charged
that the Bush war on
drugs was “phony,” but
President C linton’s “new
and im proved” strategy
has proven to be little
m ore than a kinder and gentler
replica. This is particularly true for
US-sponsored d ru g control efforts
in Latin America. U nderneath the
softer, m ore under-stated packaging
is the same basic supply-side drug
control approach of years past. But
the Clinton anti-drug strategy exists
m ore by default than by design,
m aintained by institutional inertia
and a failure of im agination.
At first glance, Clinton appears to
have m ade some notable changes.
Gone is the militaristic and inflated
rhetoric o f earlier years— references
to the “war on drugs,” for example,
are noticeably missing in recent
adm inistration reports and state
ments. International drug control is
presented as merely one piece o f a
larger foreign policy agenda that
includes prom oting dem ocracy and
free-m arket econom ic reforms.
Gone is the crusading moralizing
tone which so distinguished
Republican predecessors. Perhaps
most im portantly, o th er pressing
issues—health care, crime, the
N orth Am erican Free Trade
A greem ent—have largely m onopo
lized the political spotlight since
Clinton took office.
Signs o f potential change in deal
ing with drugs came early on in

C

Peter Andreas is a doctoral student in
government at Cornell University. Kate
Doyle is an analyst at the National
Security Archive in Washington, DC.
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C linton’s term . In 1993, he slashed
funding for the Office of National
D rug C ontrol Policy (ONDCP) by
80 percent, and then-C hief o f Staff
Thom as McLarty told the press,
“President Clinton believes that
resources to fight the drug problem
should go to education, to treat
m ent and to enforcem ent at the
state and local level." T he ONDCP
is the drug czar’s office—a bloated
institution which had com e to sym
bolize the get-tough, punitive
approach to drug control u n d er
Republican leadership.

Latin American leaders,
accustomed to having to
appease Washington’s drugphobia, wondered if all the
fuss about drugs during the
Reagan/Bush years was
merely a passing fad.
O n its list of priorities, the
National Security Council dem oted
drug control from one of the top
three to num ber 29 of 29. Moreover,
the institutional guidance of the
international drug control campaign
was challenged when Secretary of
State W arren C hristopher requested
that the State D epartm ent’s Bureau
of International Narcotics Matters
be m erged with o ther missions,
including terrorism and crime.
Consequently, Latin American
leaders, who had grown accustom ed
to having to appease W ashington’s
drug-phobia in o rd er to secure US
econom ic aid and diplom atic good
will, rightly w ondered if all the fuss

about drugs during the R eagan/
Bush years was merely a passing fad.
US-Latin Am erican trade issues,
particularly the negotiations over
NAFTA, quickly sidelined the securi
ty concerns that had defined rela
tions with the region in the 1980s.
Attacking drugs, especially at the
source o f production, seem ed to be
relegated to the “back b u rn e r” of
adm inistration and public concerns.
Clinton rarely even m entioned
drugs since taking office.
Yet the appearance o f a policy
shift is deceptive. W hat is tem pting
to in terp ret as a change in policy is
perhaps better described as a course
o f neglect. D rug control has gone
from high- to low-profile, b u t the
substance of the international
dim ensions o f the Am erican
anti-drug strategy rem ains largely
intact. While Clinton has been less
vocal than was Bush in his enthusi
asm for foreign anti-drug cam
paigns, the US strategy in Latin
America, along with the institutions
that have been mobilized to carry it
out, rem ain firmly in place.
Nevertheless, it would be an over
statem ent to say that this is a care
fully designed, deliberate policy
decision by the adm inistration.
Rather, it is largely the result of
bureaucratic m om entum and a fail
ure of will— a willingness to let the
status quo continue while Clinton
wrestles with issues considered to be
m ore im portant.
Thus, the m ore things seem to
have changed, the m ore they have
rem ained rem arkably the same.
Rhetoric aside, C linton’s first drug
budget was basically a carbon copy
of the Bush plan; in C linton’s FY
1995 $13.2 billion request for anti
drug program s, the main in tern a
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..Long live the war on drugs

tional shift was to shave a m ere $100
million from the $1.2 billion inter
diction budget.
According to Lee Brown, head of
the ONDCP, the new strategy
ann o u n ced in February represents a
“controlled shift” away from the
P en tag o n ’s costly focus on sea and
air lanes in C entral America and the
Caribbean toward “institution-build
ing” and enforcem ent operations
aim ed prim arily at m ajor drug traf
fickers in the m ain producer coun
tries. “O u r effort is to try to stop
the drugs before they leave the
source countries,” Brown has noted.
H e told a congressional com m ittee
that “It’s easier to stop the drugs
there than when they leave.” To
those who have followed official
rationales for foreign drug control
campaigns over the years, Brown’s
words will no doubt spark a feeling
o f deja-vu. In the late 1980s, it was
George Bush who appealed to simi
lar supply-side logic, arguing that
“T he cheapest and safest way to
eradicate narcotics is to destroy
them at their source.”
Program m atic tinkering in the
mix between interdiction and
source country efforts is nothing
new. In this case, it seems to have
been p rom pted by a Septem ber
1993 National Security Council con
clusion that interdiction had proven
far too costly and ineffective, but in
the end, the declared shift in
em phasis only reduces the interdic
tion portion of the budget by seven
percent. International drug control
program s, on the o ther hand, are
up by 22 p ercen t over last year’s
budget, from $351 m illion to almost
$428 million. US funds allocated
to international d ru g control are
lower now than they were u n d er

Bush, but the decrease is a result of
last year’s congressional cuts, not
the adm inistration’s. T he Executive
branch has sought to m aintain or
raise the level o f spending for most
program s since then.

The centerpiece of the
freemarket campaign may
also ease access to the
American drug market
As the flow of goods across
the border increases
under NAFTA, it
becomes more and more
difficult to “weed out”
illegal flows.
M aintaining program s that have
proven largely ineffective is often
justified on defensive grounds. “We
can ’t stop our efforts— that would
be to doom a num ber o f these
countries to even greater attack by
narco-traffickers,” says Tim othy E.
W irth, a State D epartm ent official
who advises the White House on
drug policies. Thus, rath er than the
gung-ho roll-back philosophy
toward drug trafficking o f the
R eagan/B ush era, the Clinton
approach sounds m ore like a policy
o f resigned containm ent. It is basi
cally a kind of holding-action, dri
ven by the belief that is easier to
shift into a lower gear than to build
an entirely new transmission.
Thus, in practice, operations on
the gro und continue on in m uch
the same m ode as in previous years.

T he list o f drug-related program s is
familiar: crop eradication, substitu
tion, destruction of processing labs,
targeting o f m ajor traffickers, ju d i
cial reform , and so on. While the
role of the D epartm ent of Defense
is scheduled to be scaled back
slightly on the interdiction front,
the Pentagon has asked Congress to
approve its participation in training
Latin Am erican police forces.
T he role of Latin militaries in the
drug control effort will presumably
be reduced as Pentagon-trained
param ilitary police forces becom e
operational. But while de-escalating
the involvement o f local militaries
in the anti-drug cam paign is wel
com ed by many, a greater role for
m ilitarized police forces m eans that
the punitive supply-side logic of the
strategy persists.
In Colombia, US assistance con
tinues to focus on the twin objec
tives of counterinsurgency and
counternarcotics through support
to the country’s police and military
forces. T he US provided intelli
gence and com m unications support
during the h u n t for dru g kingpin
Pablo Escobar, and US military p er
sonnel operate ground-based radars
to m onitor overflights of potential
drug traffickers. Am erican military
teams continue to train with their
Colom bian counterparts, and US
troops are helping the Colombians
build a series of bases, according to
US am bassador M orris Busby, to
“increase the battlefronts against
the guerrillas and narcotrafficking
organizations.” Apparently, the
adm inistration is no t particularly
concerned about the continued
blurring o f the distinction between
anti-drug and anti-guerrilla cam
paigns.
H em isphere • Sum mer 1994
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Meanwhile, the Colom bian drug
trade continues to flourish. Escobar
is dead and the M edellin drug car
tel is crippled, but the Cali cartel
has quickly captured M edellin’s lost
m arket shares, and is now responsi
ble for some 80 p ercent of the
cocaine exported to the U nited
States. Moreover, both poppy and
m arijuana crops are expanding as
Colom bia’s d ru g en trepreneurs con
tinue to diversity their exports. So
far, the Colom bian governm ent has
shown little interest in confronting
the Cali traffickers, although this
may change as a result o f highly
visible US pressure on the new
Colombian president, Ernesto
Samper.
In Peru, the adm inistration has
renew ed aid to the Fujimori govern
m ent, with $42 m illion requested
for d ru g control. T he US-funded
Santa Lucia anti-drug base in the
U pper Huallaga valley has been
declared defunct as trafficking oper
ations have moved out of the base’s
range, b u t the US will reportedly
support new m obile bases in the val
ley and beyond. US-supported heli
copters have been transferred to a
facility in Pucallpa, 200 miles to the
east, and State D epartm ent drug
control funds will pay for future
changes. P eru continues to produce
about two-thirds o f the w orld’s sup
ply o f coca, the raw m aterial for
cocaine, which generates m ore for
eign exchange than any o ther
export.
For d ru g control operations in
Bolivia, the adm inistration request
ed $68 million. T he US is calling
jo in t anti-drug efforts there a great
success, noting Bolivia’s “political
will” to curb the d ru g trade. The
successes— m easured num bers of
arrests, am ount of drugs seized, and
laboratories destroyed— have
nonetheless barely d en ted the
n atio n ’s expansive illicit export
industry, which rem ains Bolivia’s
single m ost im portant source of
em ploym ent and foreign exchange.

While Bolivia has traditionally spe
cialized in coca production, increas
ing am ounts o f cocaine are now
being refined as well.

Prohibiting the movement of
some goods (i.e. drugs)
while liberalizing virtually
everything else is a recipe
for policy frustration

T here is m ore continuity than
change in o ther areas o f the adm in
istration’s foreign drug control strat
egy as well. In order to assure
“progress” abroad, the Clinton
adm inistration plans to not only
continue to tie econom ic aid to
anti-drug objectives in the region,
but prom ises to toughen the certifi
cation process. In the past, critics
charged that practicing such “condi
tionality” failed to prom ote broader
US international developm ent
objectives, and fostered m istrust and
resentm ent am ong recipient
nations. While the effectiveness of
such a heavy-handed approach
rem ains dubious, W ashington offi
cials apparently believe it gives them
needed leverage over many drug
producing nations.
In a rhetorical move, the adm inis
tration has also packaged its support
for dem ocracies and free-m arket
reform s as contributing to the fight
against drugs. According to the
adm inistration’s m ost recent
National Drug C ontrol Strategy
report, “...the growth o f dem ocracy
and free-m arket econom ies presents
new international narcotics control
opportunities that did not exist a
few years ago. T he U nited States
finds th at dem ocratic, market-ori
ented governm ents are m uch easier
to work with and m ore willing to
cooperate with the international
com m unity in a com m on effort

against the illicit drug industry.
This allows greater international
cooperation against the d ru g trade
and...the developm ent of m ore
sophisticated and com prehensive
strategies to reduce both the incen
tive and capacity for international
narcotics trafficking.”
This sounds reasonable enough,
but in practice it is no t at all clear
that liberalizing m arkets will make it
easier to prohibit illicit d ru g m ar
kets. Since licit and illicit markets
are intimately intertw ined in many
o f Latin A m erica’s dru g producing
countries, m arket deregulation may
actually have the effect o f m aking it
m ore difficult to regulate the drug
trade. Prohibiting the m ovem ent of
some goods (i.e. drugs) while liber
alizing the m ovem ent of virtually
everything else is a recipe for policy
frustration.
For example, some d ru g control
officials have acknowledged that
NAFTA, the centerpiece o f their
free m arket campaign, may also
ease access to the Am erican drug
m arket. The basic problem is th at as
the flow of goods across the
US-Mexican border increases u n d er
NAFTA, it becomes m ore and m ore
difficult to “weed o u t” illegal flows.
For example, about 1,700 trucks
cross over to the U nited States from
Juarez, Mexico every day. O ne US
customs official conceded that “most
trucks that go through customs go
through almost unim ped ed .” U nder
the trade agreem ent, trucking into
the US from Mexico will expand sig
nificantly, since Mexican truckers
will eventually be able to travel any
where in the U nited States and
Canada. As an unhappy om en of
things to come, US law enforcem ent
officials believe that the biggest
cache of cocaine ever seized in the
U nited States (a one ton supply
found in a Los Angeles warehouse)
belonged to the owner o f one of
Mexico’s biggest trucking com pa
nies. The m ore things change, the
m ore they stay the same. ■
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Southcom in the Andes
Sewall H. Menzel

ne team, one fight!
In the A ndean drug
war, the US m ilitary’s
S outhern C om m and
(SOUTHCOM) is the
D epartm ent o f D efense’s
(DOD) lead agency. After roughly
one decade o f supporting US anti
drug policy in the Andes, the bal
ance o f resources expended versus
results garn ered is causing some
frustration for the US Governm ent.
Some notable tactical successes in
intelligence, operations, training
and logistical assistance have con
tributed to the dism antling of entire
narcotrafficking organizations, tem 
porarily disrupted cocaine produc
tion and distribution, and led to the
capture of d ru g “kingpins”. Despite
these partial tactical victories, stem
m ing the tide of cocaine into the
US is at best elusive and indeterm i
nate.

O

Lessons from Bolivia
SOUTHCOM was throw n into
counternarcotics operations during
the mid-1980s as part of the Reagan
adm inistration’s militarized
approach to suppressing the flow of
cocaine into the US. By the end of
1985 the d ru g war in the Andes was
bogged down in a quagm ire of
socioeconom ic and political prob
lems endem ic to the cocaine pro
ducing countries of Bolivia, P eru
and Colombia.

Seivall H. Menzel is currently teaching
Latin American politics at Florida
International University. As a colonel
in the US Army, he served in Bolivia
and on the staff of the US Southern
Command during the period 1985-89.
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Able to plan, organize, coordinate
and deploy Army, Navy, and Air
Force com ponents from headquar
ters in Panam a, DOD was a logical
candidate to becom e one of the
lead agencies in embassy- and DEA(Drug E nforcem ent Adm inistration)
sponsored anti-drug operations.

The possibility of
the Andean militaries
shooting down innocent
civilians as a result of
US intelligence reports
casts an ominous shadow
over aerial interdiction.
This capability was clearly dem on
strated in 1986 when, with only two
weeks notice from the White House,
SOUTHCOM deployed the heli
copter supported Task Force Janus
(160 m en and six Blackhawk heli
copters) in support o f DEA-directed
anti-drug forces in the semi-tropical
plains o f the Bolivian Beni.
“O peration Blast Furnace” propelled
the US military into the drug war in
no uncertain terms. Ten years and
several billions of dollars later, deci
sive results have yet to be achieved.
In Bolivia, Blast F urnace’s initial
im pact on narcotrafficking was sig
nificant bu t short-lived, owing to its
focus on the laboratory system
throughout the Bolivian Amazon.
W hen the US military left, narcotraffickers immediately resum ed
production and m arketing. By early
1987, they were operating as though
nothing had ever happened. US
military strategists were convinced

that sponsoring similar operations
on a sustained basis would resolve
the problem .
T hat same year, u n d er the code
nam e “Red D ragon”, the US
Embassy in La Paz hosted a series of
SOUTHCOM Special Forces (G reen
Berets) teams, which trained the
U nidad Movil de Patrullaje Rural
(UMOPAR), Bolivia’s elite rural
anti-drug police. UH-1 helicopters
and “P iranha” swift boats becam e
part of the plethora o f assets that
DOD and SOUTHCOM provided in
support o f the DEA/UMOPAR
operations.
At a SOUTHCOM conference in
Panam a, statem ents from Ann
Wrobleski, then Deputy Assistant
Secretary at the B ureau of
International Narcotics Matters
(INM), confirm ed that the US did
no t have a sound overall anti-drug
strategy: “We ju st o perate!” was the
policy in play. In military circles,
com parisons to the erstwhile US
policy during the Vietnam War were
unavoidable. As in Vietnam, success
ful tactical operations were conduct
ed in the vacuum o f a genuine strat
egy focused on an enemy “center of
gravity” (a Clausewitzian term ).
In the military, identifying a cen
ter o f gravity is vital to plan the use
of military assets for decisive results.
The key question then is: W hat is
the center of gravity in the Andean
drug war? Is it the hu ndreds of
thousands of coca farm ers spread
throughout the A ides? the thou
sands of laboratories? the air, land,
sea, and riverine transportation sys
tems? precursor chemicals involved
in the production of cocaine p ro d 
ucts? the drug lords, or their m in
ions/organizations? While the
debate raged, US anti-drug efforts
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Partial tactical victories do little to stem the flow of cocaine
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250,000

shifted back and forth over a spec
trum of “centers of gravity.”
SOUTHCOM continued to provide
Tactical Assistance Teams (TATs) to
the US Embassy in La Paz to assist
in the operational planning and tar
geting o f narcotrafficker activities.
In 1989, the Com m ander-in-Chief
o f SOUTHCOM G eneral Maxwell
T h u rm an p u t forth a strategy con
structed on Blast F u rnace’s lessons.
He wanted to p u t US military forces
in the field, pitting them directly
against narcotraffickers. While
T h u rm an ’s proposal did no t m eet
with the approval o f the Bush White
House, it was instrum ental in
expanding SOUTHCOM ’s role in

intelligence, training, and opera
tions planning.
T h u rm an ’s O peration “Support
Justice” placed radars in Santa Cruz
and in the Beni (Bolivia), while aeri
al platform s in the form of AWACs
(Airborne W arning and C ontrol
System) aircraft provided inform a
tion to so-called Jo in t Tactical
Intelligence C oordinating Centers
in country. T hrough O peration
“Stone B ridge,” US Navy SEALs and
Marines trained Bolivian Navy and
Police riverine patrols while Green
Berets trained infantry battalions in
anti-drug functions.
SOUTHCOM ’s activities did
enable the DEA and Bolivian anti

drug police to break up and dis
m antle the several im portant drug
trafficking organizations, including
the infam ous Isaac “O so” Chavarria
clan. Despite the success of pre
venting about a third of Bolivia’s
cocaine production from reaching
US shores, (representing only about
10 percent o f the world total), nar
cotrafficker resilience enabled the
cocaine m anufacturing process to
flourish even u n d er the increased
presence o f US military support.
Even civic action efforts, used
extensively in Vietnam, were
brought into play in Bolivia to
am eliorate the potentially negative
image o f a heightened US military
H em isphere • Sum m er 1994
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presence. Despite medical facilities,
schools, and runway construction
projects, civic action becam e
extremely controversial. In 1993,
when the Bolivian Congress failed
to approve US troop presence, these
activities were canceled.

Peruvian Failures
In Peru, SOUTHCOM support
operations m irrored activities in
Bolivia, b u t with even m ore dismal
results. Owing largely to a com plex
alliance between the Shining Path
insurgents and the narcotraffickers,
the DEA base at Santa Lucia in the
U pper Huallaga Valley proved inef
fective in stem m ing the flow of
roughly two-thirds o f the w orld’s
cocaine supply (about 1,000 metric
tons)— n o t for want o f US military
support.
SOUTHCOM worked around the
problem by im plem enting an aerial
interdiction support campaign
using gro u n d based radars along
the n o rth Peruvian border with
Colombia in conjunction with
AWACs aircraft to deal with the
rep o rted 70 to 90 narcotrafficker
flights per m onth (interspersed
am ong h undreds of o ther legitimate
com m ercial flights). US radar on
the gro u n d and in the air handed
off suspected targets to the Peruvian
Air Force which proceeded to force
or shoot down suspected narcotraf
fickers. A two year tally by early 1992
indicated that some 124 aircraft had
been rep o rted as shot down (out of
an estim ated total of some 2,000
flights) and things were thought to
be going reasonably well until May
1992, when the Peruvian Air Force
shot down one of SOUTHCOM ’s C130s on a clandestine reconnais
sance mission. T he controversy gen
erated by this incident pu t USPeruvian m ilitary relations on ice
for about a year. Since the narcotraf
fickers saturated the airways and
flew at night, smuggling continued
via state-of-the art narco-aircraft
guided on SOUTHCOM radar
40
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beams, flying at tree top level to
avoid detection.

Narcotraffickers merely
ivrite off the losses inflicted
by SOUTHCOM and other
anti-drug agencies as the
cost of doing business.
Colombian Promises
In Colombia, SOUTHCOM
focused considerable support and
effort beginning in the late 1980s.
Multi-service training and support
teams work with Colom bian Navy,
Marines, Army and Air Force units
operating in conjunction with the
governm ent’s anti-drug police
forces. Intelligence, logistics, opera
tions and m aintenance trainers,
advisors and technicians have been
brought into play to enhance the
airlift support and air surveillance
capabilities o f the Air Force, the
riverine capabilities of the Marine
Corps and the ground capabilities
of the Army. G reen Berets, SEALs
and M arines are now allowed to
accom pany Colom bian military and
police forces on anti-drug “training”
patrols against the narcotraffickers.
As in Bolivia, US Army civic action
construction projects stirred a huge
controversy and were curtailed in
1993.
In term s of intelligence support,
the US m ilitary’s role is significant.
G round based radars, AWACs and
other all-source intelligence gather
ing systems have assisted in the cap
ture of some key narcotraffickers
plying their trade throughout
Colombia. In addition, Aerostat
radar balloons operating as part of
the C aribbean Basin R adar Network
have ham pered the flow o f narco
trafficker aircraft through Central
America and the Caribbean.
After spending about $1 billion for

the aircraft and ships to detect and
m onitor drug smuggling, SOUTH
COM estimates that between 1,500
and 3,000 aircraft and some 3,000
to 5,000 drug smuggling ship move
m ents take place each year. Aircraft
entering and exiting Colombia
alone have a choice of some 497
authorized airports and an o th er
roughly 1 1,000 dirt airstrips.
Traffickers have also resorted to
fiberglass mini-submarines.
Ironically, the aerial interdiction
issue came to a head in early May
1994 when the Pentagon and o th er
governm ent legal authorities per
suaded the National Security
Council and the president to stop
sharing US radar anti-drug aerial
intercept inform ation with the
A ndean governm ents. T here was an
evolving, yet sincere fear, on the
p art of the US governm ent that the
US was inadvertently m aking itself
party to hum an rights violations.
T he possibility of the Andean mili
taries shooting down in n o cen t civil
ians as a result o f US intelligence
reports casts an om inous shadow
over the aerial interdiction portions
of the US anti-drug policy. T hat the
change in the policy was m ade
abruptly with little or no coordina
tion with the governm ents of
Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia added
considerably to existing tensions
that had arisen from the US’s appar
ent lack o f confidence in its deal
ings with A ndean anti-drug allies.
T he US m ilitary’s intelligence tar
geting and interdiction support
efforts were part of President Bush’s
A ndean Initiative. This was p art of
a deliberate “three tie r” anti-drug
interdiction strategy for the
Americas (disrupting narcotrafficking along the US frontier, in Central
America and the Caribbean, and
the Andes) im plem ented from 1989
into 1994. Yet all was n o t well.
A Septem ber 1993 rep o rt from
the G eneral Accounting Office
(GAO/NSIAD 93-220:3) concluded
“the governm ent’s investm ent in
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m ilitary OPTEMPO [flying hours
and naval steam ing days] does not
ap p ear to be providing a reasonable
retu rn . Estimated cocaine flow has
n o t appreciably declined and most
d ru g smugglers are not interdicted.”
Reacting to the critical report and
its own analysis which indicated that
the d ru g flow from the Andes had
not been sufficiently curtailed as to
effect its availability on US markets,
the Office of National Drug C ontrol
Policy’s new strategy for 1994 began
a “controlled shift” o f interdiction
assets to Colombia, Peru, and
Bolivia. President C linton’s
Presidential Directive 14 effectively
curtailed the Bush “three tier” strat
egy to focus principally on the
Andes.
DOD w orried that overall com bat
readiness of the SOUTHCOM
forces involved in anti-drug opera
tions m ight be eroded by the

M
D

Facing the Truth
Why does narcotrafficking flour
ish in the face o f extensive US mili
tary anti-drug activity and deadly
confrontations with local govern
m ent police and military forces?
T he answer lies in the fact that the
US military, at the behest o f the US
governm ent, has seized upon a false
center o f gravity focused on the sup
ply side structure of the narcotraf
fickers in the Andes. T he key center
o f gravity, only now beginning to be
understood by the US governm ent

e l l o n

o c t o r a l

Latin

expanded military role in the drug
war. Using military equipm ent
designed for fighting wars but
em ployed for law enforcem ent was
no longer cost effective. Funding
for military anti-drug surveillance
grew from $212 million in fiscal year
1989 to $962 million in fiscal year
1992.

American

r

F
and

F

o u n d a t i o n

e l l o w s h ip s
Caribbean

bu t n o t yet properly addressed, lies
on the dem and side. Strong
dem and, reinforced by high profits
involving thousands o f dollars per
kilogram o f cocaine produced and
sold in the U nited States and
Europe, drives and motivates the
supply structure of narcotrafficking
in the Andes. Narcotraffickers
merely write off the losses inflicted
by SOUTHCOM and o th er anti
drug agencies as the cost o f doing
business. When one narcotraffick
er group is brought to bay and
forced out o f business, an o th er
merely rises and continues the for
m er’s place. As in Vietnam, the
focus on a false center o f gravity in
the drug war strategy has stymied
the US governm ent and its military,
preventing anti-drug policies from
achieving decisive results. ■
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he Latin American and Caribbean C enter at Florida International University (FIU) is offering a lim 
ited num ber o f M ellon Foundation Doctoral Fellowships in Caribbean Studies for academic year
1995-96. Candidates m ust be successful applicants to FIU doctoral programs in economics, inter

national relations, history, or comparative sociology, and dem onstrate graduate research potential on or w ith
in Caribbean area studies. Fellowships include a two-year stipend, full tuition, and are renewable. Applicants

w ith M.A. degrees will be given priority. M ellon Fellowship applicants should subm it the FIU graduation
application. In addition, copies o f their university application, including transcripts and G R E scores, and the
Fellowship application (with attachm ents) should go to Tricia Juhn, Research Coordinator, LACC, Florida
International University, M iam i, FL 33199. Inquiries may be directed to tel. (305) 348-2894/Fax (305) 3483593 or e-mail JU H N T@ SER V A X .FIU .ED U .
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Politics of Perception
Jennifer E. Smith

Images & Intervention: US Policies
in Latin America
by Martha Cottam
Pitt Latin American Series,
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994.
226 pp., bibliography and index.

the cases of G uatem ala (1954), post1960 Cuba, and Chile u n d er
Allende (1970-73). Despite the
inauguration of radical reform poli
cies in 1952 Bolivia, no such inter
vention occurred because the gov
ern m en t o f Victor Paz Estenssoro,
by winning the advocacy o f thenrawing on the framework
President Eisenhower’s brother
Milton, m anipulated its image away
o f political psychology,
from associations with the enemy.
political scientist M artha
Similarly, the Peruvian nationaliza
Cottam analyzes the last
half century o f US for
tions of the late 1960s-early 1970s
eign policy in Latin
invoked the d ep en d en t image,
America. Now well into the post-which inspired some m edium -range
Cold War era, Cottam asserts that
econom ic sanctions, but forestalled
N orth-South relations in the hem i
the likelihood o f outright US inter
sphere have altered little since the
vention. D uring the C entral
bipolar days, and does no t antici
Am erican crisis, the perception of
pate change so long as the US
the isthm us’s association with the
image of Latin America as “depen
enem y explains the intense preoc
d e n t” continues to hold.
cupation with containm ent/rollback
Across a range o f cases, Cottam
strategy that began at the tail en d of
identifies US policy m akers’ cogni
the C arter adm inistration, peaked
tive image o f Latin Am erican coun
u n d er Reagan, and dim inished as
tries as dependent—weak, inferior,
the Eastern bloc began to crum ble
childlike, inept, and co rru p t—as
during the adm inistration of
the prim e mover of coercive policies
George Bush.
characterized by “ordering rather
T he dep en d en t image of Latin
than negotiating, using coercive
America, however, did no t change;
instrum ents when no ne are called
and perhaps m ore menacingly, gun
for, and expressing contem pt for
boat diplomacy took on a new
the d ep e n d en t’s p eo ple” (p. 63).
unpredictability with the dissolution
T he shift from coercive behavior
of containm ent as a unifying securi
into outright coup (intervention)
ty goal. T he D ecem ber 1989 US
occurs when Latin Am erican gov
invasion of Panam a, for example,
ernm ents becom e associated with
dem onstrated that “the enemy
the perception of the enemy, as in
image simply conditions the nature
of the intervention...w ithout con
tainm ent, the m an n er of interfer
ence is less predictable...the percep
Jennifer E. Smith is a recent graduate of
tion and evaluation o f the depen
the M.Phil. program in Latin American
den t [regime] ...and US domestic...
Studies at Oxford University, where she
conditions take on m uch greater
wrote her thesis on US Drug Policy in
im portance. T he instrum ents, on
Peru in the 1980s. She is now a
the o ther hand, still resem ble...gun
researcher in Washington, DC.
boat diplomacy” (p. 162).
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Explorations into the connections
am ong image, perception, and
power politics take on new and
urg en t relevance in this age of the
m edia onslaught. O pinions held by
and relations am ong decision mak
ers are form ed no t over a series of
interactions, but instantaneously,
through television and p rin t media.
Similarly, the choices o f leaders can
be narrow ed and broad en ed by con
stituents’ perceptions of public poli
cy issues. For a num ber o f years
leading up to the US Congressional
vote on the N orth Am erican Free
Trade Agreem ent, Mexican
President Carlos Salinas orchestrat
ed a m asterful public relations blitz
to sell a new image o f his country as
the m odern civilization o f unlim ited
socio-economic potential (See
rep o rt by Raul Benitez M anaut).
Fidel C astro’s successful m anipula
tion of the Im perial Yankee has the
n et effect of narrow ing options for
C uban citizens: no m atter how tight
things get, it’s better than living
with the enemy. And m ost sham e
lessly, the protagonists in the Haiti
dram a unfurl one image after
an o th er to achieve their separate
ends.
But perhaps m ore than in any
other public policy debate, the US
governm ent’s war on drugs fights a
constant battle—which it sometimes
wins—with perception and image.
US policymakers tend to define
anti-drug efforts as an actual or
potential security threat. Latin
Americans, in contrast, present nar
cotrafficking m ore as a problem of
public health and law enforcem ent.
Only since the waning days o f the
Cold War, and presumably motivat
ed by a desire to tap into US
resources, have Latin Am erican gov

F

ernm ents been willing to define
narcotrafficking principally as a
national security threat. In practice,
US political hegemony, and its con
trol over valuable external funding
resources, has m eant that Latin
Americans concede to US percep
tions and definitions o f public poli
cy issues, or face the consequences.
A recen t exam ple is the highly visi
ble squabble between the Clinton
State D epartm ent team and the
new Colom bian president,
Ernesto Samper, who, im m edi
ately after his electoral victory,
was sum m oned to W ashington
to “discuss” his pending anti
d ru g strategies.
Reinforcing im portant
disagreem ents over public
policy issues are the
m onolithic perceptions
touted by Latins and
N orth Americans
regarding each
o th e r’s civilizations.
Latin Am ericans
i
view A m erican
A
dem and for drugs
as a natural consequence
of that society’s vice-ridden, exces
sive consum er mentality. US gov
ern m e n t anti-drug efforts, there
fore, are a placebo as long as
dem and continues. O n the other
hand, even am ong the educated
personnel at the Bureau of
In ternational Narcotics Matters, US
perception o f Latin Americans is
colored by the old myths of the
Black Legend and the in h ere n t cor
ruptibility and lawlessness of
Spanish colonials. US anti-drug
strategy, through less vitriolic u n d er
Clinton than u n d er his predecessors
(see article by Andreas and Doyle),
indicate that the image o f being

O

R

dep en d en t and associated with an
enem y continue to influence
inform ation processing
and strategy selec
tion.

It will be interesting to see if and
how this changes as we leave the
Cold War era behind.
C linton’s foreign policy team is
(for the m om ent) com posed of
many form er C arter staffers. O ne
test o f C ottam ’s argum ent may be to
see how a m odified cold warrior
team reacts to Latin Am erican crises
during a period o f less obvious en e
mies. C linton’s treatm ent o f Haiti,
for example, exhibits m ost of the

U

M

characteristics that Cottam identifies
with a d ep en d en t image in the
absence o f the enemy. W ithout the
unifying goal of containm ent, policy
has been subject to a wide variety of
conflicting dom estic concerns, con
tributing to highly inconsistent
strategies which have been
assailed from virtually all
parts o f the political spec
trum .
C linton, while cam paigning,
stated that he did n o t agree
with Bush’s refugee policy of
strict repatriation, but did not
reverse the policy upon his elec
toral victory, realizing the political
costs o f accepting a flood o f poor
Haitians into Florida. A nother key
source of support, the AfricanAm erican political community,
denounced the policy as racist, and
this too has been an im portant fac
tor in pushing C linton’s Haiti team
in o th er directions. Indeed, the
past two years o f policymaking have
witnessed a pendular m ovem ent,
from strict repatriation to the possi
bility of asylum hearings aboard US
ships to no chance o f refugee reset
tlem ent in the US. Agreem ents with
o th er countries to accept some
refugees have been largely unsuc
cessful, even Panam a reneged on a
previous offer. As o f this writing,
econom ic sanctions have not been
useful and the intransigence o f the
ruling H aitian military, com bined
with m ounting squabbles here at
hom e, have m ade the threat o f US
military intervention practically a
political necessity. If military action
does take place, C ottam ’s contention
that intervention assumes its most
coercive form where the dep en d en t
image works without the enemy asso
ciation will be borne out. ■
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